Skip to main content
Topic: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems (Read 72573 times)

Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

I like to re-use older threads, but the Rationalist thread is full of bad karma, so I am creating a new one for this topic.


But no one pays attention to the pre socratics these days.

Not quite true: Among other things, some pre-Socratic Greek Stoics did creditable work on what we now call the sentential calculus; that the logic of the syllogism eclipsed it is a fact of history that I think retarded both science and logic/mathematics…

Disregarding the ahistoricity of the view that there were any Stoics before Socrates, what makes the syllogism inferior and the propositional calculus superior? Specifically and at length please. And in your own words, no links to external writers thankyouverymuch.

Or, since the argument from authority seems to be inevitable for you, let's try this way too:

(Yes, I do think that the "modern" first-order predicate calculus should have been recognized and formalized in the Middle Ages. Instead, we had to wait until 1879… :) )(Popper himself said this.*)

In a few summarising sentences, what did Popper say as per you? And why should the first-order predicate calculus have been invented in the middle ages? What seemed to be leading up to it? What necessitated it? Or what would have been the benefits, had it been invented?

(Mind you, in my native language it's a strict impossibility to use "invent" in this way. Logic and its glory can only be a discovery, not invention. To speak of invention here is like saying that Columbus invented America.)


Do numbers "exist" before they are constructed? Was the square root of two (or negative one) an entity before someone considered them?
Consider π: We do really know that it is an irrational and transcendental number. (Don't we?) And that it is merely the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter… (Not an unusual nor certainly bizarre notion!) Why is it thus?

It's to do with the nature of things. The ratio of the circumference to the diameter is what it is independent of your opinion. It also stays as it is regardless of your inventions, reinventions and attempts to improve it.


Have you recanted your belief in Platonic ideas, and accepted the Nominalism of common sense? :)

Can you state the basic tenets of Nominalism and explain in a few words why it's better than Platonic ideas? Then I will follow up with questions how and why nominalism should be regarded as common sense.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #1
You've tasked me severely, ersi! :) And insulted me and my intelligence a few times along the way, all in one post… Still, I'll make the attempt. It will be by fits and starts, as the mood strikes me, as my schedule permits. (And, well you should know, I'm apt to edit -specially by addition- at any time everything I write.)
Okay with you? :)

To begin with: Did you never wonder why I rejected the work of Algazel you steered me to? All his arguments stopped at his dogmatic Islam, and -for him- to question or contradict Islam was proof of error.
Not much there, for me, unless I was willing to join up! I wasn't. I'm still not.
I don't accept that kind of Authority…

So, here we go:
what makes the syllogism inferior and the propositional calculus superior? Specifically and at length please. And in your own words, no links to external writers thankyouverymuch.

A combinatorial formulation of generality with the sentence connectives was unnecessary: The few (valid) modes of the syllogism were idolized as the epitome of logic…suitable for doctrinal squabbles, from received dogma; but not much else.
The focus on the terms of the syllogistic culminated in what I'd call "the logical suppositories"… But the silliness of existential import was already enough to beg for a better formalism!

(I suspect you'll dislike "my own words" but, then, you asked for them… :) )

The predicate calculus was that better formalism.
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)


Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #3

You've tasked me severely, ersi! :) And insulted me and my intelligence a few times along the way, all in one post…

You welcome.


To begin with: Did you never wonder why I rejected the work of Algazel you steered me to?

No, I never wondered, because the answer is easily found. There are only two viable explanations: Either you have a different formal logic which is more suitable for your temperament or you don't have logic at all, even though you pretend to have it. The latter option always seemed more likely. Take it as an insult if you wish, but the post you provided right now confirmed my hunch once again, as I kindly explain below.


All his arguments stopped at his dogmatic Islam, and -for him- to question or contradict Islam was proof of error.
Not much there, for me, unless I was willing to join up! I wasn't. I'm still not.
I don't accept that kind of Authority…

I view philosophy strictly as a formal system. The terms within the system are merely indicative. Essentially it doesn't matter what the terms are. What matters is their mutual consistency and coherence. I surrender to the authority of coherence. Al-Ghazali represents the same view for me. The fact that he praises Islam at every turn is just a superficial issue. If you cannot bite through the surface, then true philosophy is probably not for you.


So, here we go:
what makes the syllogism inferior and the propositional calculus superior? Specifically and at length please. And in your own words, no links to external writers thankyouverymuch.

A combinatorial formulation of generality with the sentence connectives was unnecessary: The few (valid) modes of the syllogism were idolized as the epitome of logic…suitable for doctrinal squabbles, from received dogma; but not much else.
The focus on the terms of the syllogistic culminated in what I'd call "the logical suppositories"… But the silliness of existential import was already enough to beg for a better formalism!

(I suspect you'll dislike "my own words" but, then, you asked for them… :) )

The predicate calculus was that better formalism.

The question remains: How is the predicate calculus better? You attack the syllogism, but you are not providing an alternative, and you are not revealing why you opt for the alternative.

To me it looks like your attack is a thinly veiled satire of the institutional history of Aristotelianism, as it occurred amidst European Medieval theologians, instead of a properly critical analysis of the syllogistic logic that Aristotle formalised. Try again, please.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #4

Donc, Il doit existre!!
Respondez, Monsieur!

:)
A matter of attitude.


Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #6
All my previous questions stand as long as you haven't answered. And here's some more.


To begin with: Did you never wonder why I rejected the work of Algazel you steered me to? All his arguments stopped at his dogmatic Islam, and -for him- to question or contradict Islam was proof of error.

This begs the question: What is the purpose of logic for you?

For me the purpose is exactly the clear standard of proof. Proof of error and correctness is the purpose of logic.

For example, 2+2=4 is not just a random statement among others. It's a mathematical statement standing as true based on mathematical proof (i.e. the statement is systemically coherent). If someone asserted that 2+2=5 and that this supposedly lends support to some other statements, then there's no way to think that we might be witnessing some amazing scientific breakthrough. Instead, we have absolutely certain proof that he is talking BS.

The meaning and value of 2+2=4 is universal, even though the statement would look different when written in a different writing system. Similarly, Islam in Ghazali's writings is just a notation system, whereas the underlying logic is universal. Superficially he is writing about Allah and quoting Koran, but this can be viewed as a formal tool to illustrate the nature of deductive proof.

Some kind of terms or tools are necessary to provide the lesson and to convey the teaching. As Belfrager demonstrated, the notation system can consist of symbolic marks, but in Ghazali's case, the terms found in Koran serve the purpose.

It's particularly evident in "The Just Balance" how Ghazali interprets select verses as expandable to complete syllogisms, then he analyses the syllogisms and concludes that that's the meaning of Koran. It should go without saying that Koran is merely an instrument for a didactical purpose in this process. The purpose is to rehearse the logic, to train the mind to see the unseen, viz. the universals.

Mathematical terms work the same way, terms such as the objects of arithmetic, geometry, algebra, set theory, etc. Same again with metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, theology, ethics, and other fields of philosophy. They all consist of formal objects arranged by the same underlying logic. The common characteristic in them is internal consistency. The standard of proof is the same in all.

So, what is the purpose of logic for you? I hope you do not use it only as a handy device to howl "Foul!" on fellow beings just for occasional fun, without any further commitment.

Let's repeat the smaller questions too here for your convenience:
- What makes the syllogism inferior and the propositional calculus superior?
- Why should the first-order predicate calculus have been invented in the middle ages? What would have been the benefits?
- What does Nominalism entail that makes it superior to Platonism? What's objectionable about Platonism?

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #7
Just a little busy work for you, ersi: Kindly recast Gödel's incompleteness theorems in your preferred formalism…

I'll wait. :)
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #8

Just a little busy work for you, ersi: Kindly recast Gödel's incompleteness theorems in your preferred formalism…

I'll wait. :)

No need to wait. I have already done that, and I will demonstrate it to you at the bottom of this post.

First things first. We both know that you are not busy with work. Any thinker of your age, if he can be called a thinker, has thought things through deeply enough to be able to give, at any moment, the answers to the little baby questions I asked. We both know that the answers are not forthcoming. You hate to reveal yourself. You never put your ideas to test and you won't let anyone else do it either. As long as you haven't answered, my sad assumptions that I spelled out in the previous post in this thread stand confirmed.

Instead of thoroughly testing ideas against ideas, you like to bash other minds. I got the answer to all I wanted to know from another thread.



I long ago gave up the search for unassailable warrants.
Those who still want (! both senses !: lack and desire…) unassailable warrants mystify me! (That is, I don't understand what they want (ask) of me. Is nodding my head whenever they speak sufficient? Repeating their particular verbal formulations? Giving them access to my bank accounts? :) )

It's not mystifying at all that your hypocrisy spoils your environment, particularly when on other occasions you continue to ridicule people for their beliefs and character whenever they differ from yours. There are many explanations why this is so and should be so. For example:


Why are my personal, eccentric pronouncements not given the primacy and potency of -say- Gautama? Because no statues of me exist?

Because, according to the standard of proof, you fail. That's why Gautama stands high and you lie low.

The Mystical experience is another form of discovering

Or as Sparta so eloquently puts it: BS!

See, this is exactly what I am talking about. You are an intelligent man. You have the capacity of understanding. You know what coherence is. You know what proof is. But what do you do with all this? You don't give coherent proof of anything, you merely spew sarcastic ridicule and you think it's funny. Actually, it is funny that you think that with this kind of attitude you should be considered equal to the Buddha, or anybody of consequence for that matter.

When you have intellect and wisdom at a workable level, the rest depends on attitude. You knew this, but you have chosen to live your life differently.

Now Gödel. To understand how to solve the seeming dilemma arising from Gödel's incompleteness theorem, you have to realise that the theorem itself is not everything. First let's clear away the fallacy of conflating the label with the thing, the description with the event, a statement about the fact with the fact. The label is one thing, the thing itself is another. Gödel's theorems apply to the formal systems, i.e. the labels and statements, not to things, events, and facts.

Given this distinction, it is evident that internal consistency is not the only basis on which to prove the validity of a formal system. Internal consistency is necessary and inevitable when you want to have a valid formal system, but there's an additional consideration which makes the system truly unshakable, namely matching it against facts. And facts are not merely physical empirical facts, but obviously also things such as mathematical objects.

Gödel's theorem applies to internal coherence of formal systems, but doesn't apply to the additional verification against facts. And naturally I consider mathematical objects as facts, whereas math as a formal system is a list of statements about those objects. Moreover, notice how Gödel was able to prove his own theorem, against the odds of the theorem.

The dilemma doesn't really exist, because Gödel's theorem is just another formal proof that has been run successfully, thus confirming the usefulness of formal proofs. Tacitly, wiser minds already knew that no set of axioms is complete in itself, and are subject to change. Why? Because any formal system is a set of statements not about itself, but about something else. The set of axioms must ultimately be chosen appropriately according to the circumstances, circumstances such as the nature of the problem in question, the capacity of the person/community confronting the problem, the language workable as the means of communication to convey the solution, etc. That's why in addition to science and math also philosophy and religion exist, to cater to all the different needs and provide all the solutions to the different problems that people confront.

Anyway, you didn't even mention any dilemma. You were probably just being irrelevant as per usual. I will be happy to be proven wrong. Maybe you assume I like to be right, but you'd have to prove that too, if you want your assumption to have proper validity. Unfortunately we have seen that proof is really not your thing. I don't like to be right in this, but I must surrender to facts.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #9
ersi, fact and truth is different world .

sometimes , fact can blur the truth .


Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #10
So, you hope no one will notice that you made no attempt to recast Gödel's theorems in syllogistic logic? Okay.

About the rest, it's your usual mode of discourse; I'm used to it, and will treat it accordingly. But one thing you said is worthy of prompt comment:
Any thinker of your age, if he can be called a thinker, has thought things through deeply enough to be able to give, at any moment, the answers to the little baby questions I asked.

Rote is not my "thing"… What answers I've thought I had seldom stay bright! Upon further reflection, I usually feel I've failed to express my thoughts well enough or that I've let go unnoticed difficulties in their formulation that no better rendering will fix.
Over many years I've acquired some few scruples, I should like to call them:


       
  • Never fail to give empirical data its due.

  •    
  • Use the best analytical tools available.

  •    
  • Take the arguments of others at face value, and

  •    
  • Seek the best interpretation of them.

I sometimes talk to children as if they were adults. Sometimes, I talk to adults as if they were children. The circumstance matters. Sometimes I talk to adults as if they were adults; I usually regret it — and they seldom appreciate it.
Your tirade did sting a little… But you might just as well have told me my nose is too big, and ugly!


What do you think of Pascal's Wager? I'll give my (almost) off-the-cuff: It's a futile gesture. Belief isn't a matter of choice… And sincerity can't be faked, if one's audience is God!
(If I'm wrong, the Creator and I will toss back a couple of cold ones before I'm sent to Hell… :) )
—————————————————
BTW: I think we can credit Sparta's BS as meaning something like "unproved hypothetical"… Or perhaps "interesting guess" or "airy words"… What do you think, ersi? :)
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #11

So, you hope no one will notice that you made no attempt to recast Gödel's theorems in syllogistic logic? Okay.

This is not what you asked. You asked it be recast in my preferred formalism. You only assume that I prefer Aristotelian syllogism, whereas in fact my absolute favourite never-failing system is Saussurean structuralism.


What answers I've thought I had seldom stay bright! Upon further reflection, I usually feel I've failed to express my thoughts well enough or that I've let go unnoticed difficulties in their formulation that no better rendering will fix.

This settles my curiosity for a loooong time. Thanks.

I'll consider Pascal's Wager (which seems to be yet another thing that interests you more than me) some other day.

Rest well from the hard work.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #12
which seems to be yet another thing that interests you more than me

There you've hit upon the nub of our back-and-forth: Sometimes something you say leads me to find something which interests me… But not often.
I'm sorry that you don't much interest me. (Since that seems to offend you. Such was not my intent.) Still, that's your fault, isn't it? Perhaps it's the venue: We must converse in English, and I am more than conversant… Also, I'm "into" disputation — for what it brings out, that would otherwise remain hidden.

Likewise, I don't see why you'd find me interesting… (Either you don't understand or you won't. I'm not asking you to become my disciple!)

While you were waiting on my reply I had a house full of people (mostly, kin) whose ages ranged some three score years… I like most of them, most times; they (most of them, sometimes) like me. Most of them I've known their entire lives: I grant them attention whenever they seem to require it. The "old ones" (my cadre) only get serious or joking moments that require our shared status…
No, I wasn't "working" in the sense of being employed by another to perform tasks for pay. But your presumption is what it is; you are who you are.
And I am who I am: I'd gladly let a "great and glorious" thought escape me, to respond to the cry of a child of mine… Priorities, ya know?
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #13
Oh! But of course you meant that Pascal's Wager seems to interest me more than it does you... Mostly un-inflected languages like English often display such ambiguity. Still, I should not have presumed the less likely meaning: But you  seem to take everything so personally! :)
____________________________________________
Structuralism is not, as I understand it, a formalism of logic. I don't consider it such, and -besides you- I doubt anyone else would.
Now Gödel. To understand how to solve the seeming dilemma arising from Gödel's incompleteness theorem, [and on and on, to missing the point...]

Gödel's incompleteness theorem is itself a mathematical object! And the logistic thesis was, prior to its (the theorem's) derivation*, considered a real(izable) possibility.
Alan Turing's work on the Halting Problem, similarly, reached the same conclusion: The logistic thesis is not viable.
_______________________________________________
* I chose 'derivation' so as not offend anyone with opinions about the create/discover issue...
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #14

What do you think of Pascal's Wager? I'll give my (almost) off-the-cuff: It's a futile gesture. Belief isn't a matter of choice… And sincerity can't be faked, if one's audience is God!

As I said (and you understood in the end), the wager never attracted my interest. Pascal may have been a philosopher of some importance otherwise (I have his Pensées on my shelf, but the book seems just a mass of random scattered notes of highly unequal value, so I won't ever bother to read it properly), but this particular bit is not his brightest moment. For me the wager does not connect at all. I am not a man of beliefs. Much less a man of just-in-case beliefs. I am a methodical problem-solver, and Pascal's Wager poses an ethical problem, exactly as you describe - sincerity cannot be faked.

The wager is a problem, not a solution. To choose to believe just in case is, as you point out, insincere, hence it won't work for sincere people. The wager seems to be meant for people of doubt, not for people of faith. Christian faith is defined in Hebrews 11:1. It is confidence (NIV) or evidence (KJV), not blind faith. The wager is for people without confidence, without capacity to secure evidence. Pascal offers them to resort to the final straw of just-in-case belief. Sad option, really.

I choose confidence in evidence over just-in-case belief any day. Works for me.

If you actually meant to ask why I am a believer, then the answer follows from above: I make sure that I know things for sure, so that I don't have to resort to beliefs. But more likely I have again answered far more than you are able to appreciate.


Structuralism is not, as I understand it, a formalism of logic. I don't consider it such, and -besides you- I doubt anyone else would.

The basic tenet of structuralism can be formulated as: Analysable reality is made of distinctions.

This is exactly how I approached the Gödel theorem issue you posed above.


Gödel's incompleteness theorem is itself a mathematical object!

This is exactly what I concluded in my analysis, unless you misread something again.


And the logistic thesis was, prior to its (the theorem's) derivation*, considered a real(izable) possibility.

Okay, so it used to be a problem somehow in historical literature. Whatever. It doesn't matter. I solved it. If certain people see no solution when they should know better, then that's their problem, not mine.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #15
In a few summarising sentences, what did Popper say as per you?

Yes, this is fairly easy: He credited the Ionian Schools with two innovations. One, cosmological theorizing; and, two, a disputational method -- as opposed to exegesis. And he believed (well, he said he did...) that these two innovations were necessary for what we now call science.

On a related matter: I believe that, were it not for the historical accident of the veneration given to Aristotelian texts upon their re-introduction to Europe (in other words, the rejection of the Ionian disputational method...), a natural extension of sentence-logic (as opposed to term-logic) involving a compatible notation for generality was easily within reach...
This is merely a counter-factual, historical argument. You yourself, ersi, are competent to critically consider it.
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #16
Okay, so it used to be a problem somehow in historical literature. Whatever. It doesn't matter. I solved it

:) Your "proof" requires a Medieval mind-set... If it doesn't fit with "approved" texts, its details and import are negligible! Except that I think you go a bit farther: If you don't "like" it, it's unimportant...
Am I entirely wrong?

The results that Gödel proved have been important to computer science.
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #17

In a few summarising sentences, what did Popper say as per you?

Yes, this is fairly easy: He credited the Ionian Schools with two innovations. One, cosmological theorizing; and, two, a disputational method -- as opposed to exegesis. And he believed (well, he said he did...) that these two innovations were necessary for what we now call science.

Indeed, these two points seem to be necessary for academical science. However, how are they missing in the syllogism? I see now that I was perfectly right when I said you were deriding the institution and politics of medieval academia rather than the logic that the medievals used. Moreover, the syllogism is perfectly alive and well in modern debates and disputes in cosmology - as it has always been. I repeat, that's disputes, not exegesis, and cosmology, not only theology.


Okay, so it used to be a problem somehow in historical literature. Whatever. It doesn't matter. I solved it

:) Your "proof" requires a Medieval mind-set... If it doesn't fit with "approved" texts, its details and import are negligible! Except that I think you go a bit farther: If you don't "like" it, it's unimportant...
Am I entirely wrong?

Yes, I must say you are entirely wrong. First, I began this thread by remarking my opposition to argument from authority, and thus far I have not identified any approved texts. It's true that I am rejecting certain arguments of yours, but never on the grounds of argument from authority. I argue based on my own argumentation that is always in plain sight here for you. When I reject your arguments, even when I say "literature", it's not a rejection of the texts you refer to, but of arguments you say they contain. Mind you, you didn't even identify the pre-Gödelian texts or authors in question, so how could I reject them?

Edit:


Gödel's incompleteness theorem is itself a mathematical object!

This is exactly what I concluded in my analysis, unless you misread something again.

Seems that you thought your interjection proved some point of yours, or proved that I missed some important point. I have been thinking how this could be, and came up with this:

Being a nominalist, you probably assume that mathematical objects come into existence as someone writes about them. Similarly, you assume that prior to Gödel nobody had any clue of the coherence problem, i.e. the mathematically provable systemic incompleteness of axiomatics as demonstrated by Gödel. As per you, this issue became known only after Gödel had written about it and others had read his texts. You say:


And the logistic thesis was, prior to its (the theorem's) derivation*, considered a real(izable) possibility.
[...]
* I chose 'derivation' so as not offend anyone with opinions about the create/discover issue...

Except that you didn't manage to circumvent the create/discover issue.

You said "Gödel's incompleteness theorem is itself a mathematical object!" as if this proved that Gödel's theorem is NOT a statement about the mathematical object and consequently my distinction is false. This shows that you didn't grasp the distinction, and you didn't grasp it for the reason that in your view the object came into existence by means of Gödel's formulation and didn't exist prior to the formulation. Hence you still presuppose the individual creation theory of mathematical objects and didn't evade the theory despite your explicit qualifications in print.

Let me explain again how the distinction works. There are facts, such as mathematical objects, on one side, and statements about them on the other. Gödel's theorem is a mathematical object alright (even though it's not a simple object like a circle, but more like a complex object or event, but this doesn't change the nature of the distinction), but Gödel's formulation about it is a statement about the object. The object exists no matter if Gödel wrote about it or not, but Gödel's formulation is how we know what we are talking about. Got it?

Another example: When I say "dog", my word is ABOUT some dog, but the word itself is not the dog. The dog does not come into existence when I talk about it. Rather, when I mention the dog, you find out that I have discovered the dog, whereas you may have discovered the dog independently without mention. For non-nominalists, this analogy applies in case of mathematical objects equally well.

Now you must have grasped this. And feel free to elaborate on the nominalist perspective. I'm always happy to learn new fascinating stuff, if it turns out to be such.


The results that Gödel proved have been important to computer science.

And/or go ahead and elaborate on this point, how you conclude this and how it is relevant to anything.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #18
Interlude:
OakdaleFTL said "I chose 'derivation' so as not offend anyone with opinions about the create/discover issue..."
Except that you didn't manage to circumvent the create/discover issue.


There's not really much of an "issue" is there? A proof of Fermat's Last Theorem exists, before anyone has created it, and -on your tack- the theorem was always true, even though it might have been false?
Wouldn't you have to say that it couldn't have been false? In that case, of what matter are mathematical proofs? Are they all-but pointless exercises, only meant to convince the recalcitrant mind of that which could and should have been merely apprehended?
In other words, we might just as well have taken Fermat's marginalia as the theorem's warrant…


Good luck getting any mathematician to acquiesce in that method!
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #19
I have been thinking how this could be, and came up with this:

Being a nominalist, you probably assume that mathematical objects come into existence as someone writes about them. Similarly, you assume that prior to Gödel nobody had any clue of the coherence problem, i.e. the mathematically provable systemic incompleteness of axiomatics as demonstrated by Gödel. As per you, this issue became known only after Gödel had written about it and others had read his texts.

You seem to conflate musings and (un-warranted) beliefs with proofs… Let's try a thought-experiment:
Can you know something that isn't true?
—————————————————————————————

Let me explain again how the distinction works. There are facts, such as mathematical objects, on one side, and statements about them on the other. Gödel's theorem is a mathematical object alright […]*, but Gödel's formulation about it is a statement about the object. The object exists no matter if Gödel wrote about it or not, but Gödel's formulation is how we know what we are talking about. Got it?

Another example: When I say "dog", my word is ABOUT some dog, but the word itself is not the dog. The dog does not come into existence when I talk about it. Rather, when I mention the dog, you find out that I have discovered the dog, whereas you may have discovered the dog independently without mention. For non-nominalists, this analogy applies in case of mathematical objects equally well.

To take your second "example" first: How am I to know you are not just hallucinating, or babbling? :) I'm well aware of the distinction between use and mention; it is ancient, but much has been made of it — since Frege's formalization of quantification… (Before that, not so much; and it was -and is!- easy to forget it, when -say- using term logic.) So, when you say "Gödel's Theorem" I can't be sure you mean by mathematical object what I'd mean…
There's evidence against that: The theorem is indeed a meta-mathematical object, in the sense that it has a proof (or was coherently posited so as to be capable of proof or disproof…), and it is merely talking about some certain (! both senses !) ways of mathematical proof — namely, axiomatizations.
I'd agree that a dog is an object, in the usual sense; so is "dog"… But I wouldn't say a dog has three letters; nor would I say that that (sic!) "dog" bites!
Further, I wouldn't say "dog" existed, before it was ever uttered (or thought, if you prefer); but that dogs likely did.
So, which is it? Is the theorem more like a dog or more like a "dog"? I'd want to argue, the latter…


It seems to me that you'd prefer to argue the former… (Balfrager, for instance, would put the cart before the horse, er, the "dog" before the dog! In a sense, I think you would too.) Indeed, wouldn't you have to say that 2 + 2 = 5 is a mathematical object no less than 2 + 2 = 4 is, rather than simply saying that it is false?
Is then this mysterious realm of existence filled with objects each individually and indistinguishably privileged? In other words, the Is of predication is, indeed, the Is of existence…?


To elaborate (rather than just refer you to my shelf at the Universal Library…), we'd likely agree that "2 + 2 = 5" is false, and that "'2 + 2 = 5' is false" is true.
What we mean by the former is that 2 + 2 does not equal 5; by the latter, the same. No? How, then, to explain the discovery of "2 + 2 = 5"?
I'd suspect some mis-communication of the rules, first. What would you presume? (Or would you just know? In which case, what would you know?) BTW: IIRC, Gödel's first theorem doesn't even require that the axiomatization only include true statements…
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #20
why should the first-order predicate calculus have been invented in the middle ages? What seemed to be leading up to it? What necessitated it? Or what would have been the benefits, had it been invented?

1. Because most of the work in logic done by some admittedly brilliant men for centuries was inconsequential! (Some people still today haven't learned the little that they presented… Ambiguity and syllogisms using classes with no members, being the most obvious difficulties.) I'd prefer the syntax of a formalization of logic to make plain or obviate most semantic impediments to reasoning correctly! But you and I have different definitions of "reasoning correctly":
I only require that one's premises require one's conclusion; from there, we can talk about the reasons for accepting or rejecting those premises. From numerous examples, I've determined that you require others to accept your premises…
2. Oops! I've just answered your other questions, too! My bad.

Without a formalism of logic that helps us to analyze terms, the "syllogizers" are often content to "spin their wheels" and, one would have thought, they'd have noticed how thread-bare their tires had become…

Didn't De Saussure argue that the meaning of particular words in particular languages were essentially arbitrary? Which is to say, your "in my native language it's a strict impossibility to use 'invent' in this way. Logic and its glory can only be a discovery, not invention" is mere ignorance or subterfuge on your part: You can't claim that the distinction is not permitted, because "your" language -so far as you know- doesn't have a ready-to-hand expression for it!
One possibility that occurs to me is that you lack access to the common store of ideas you yourself (and Balfrager!) have posited, but not explained — to my satisfaction… So: There are ideas that you can't understand because your language doesn't have a word for them?
How would you gain an un-impeded access? Who or what were you impeded by? And why…?
Or are you content to say your language is best, mine inferior; hence, you don't need to understand what I'm saying to refute it?
There's a reason why most mystics are hermits…

You might as well argue that I changed your meaning by replacing your double-quote signs with single-quote signs around your invent above… Either we are communicating, one or both of us won't, or one or both of us can't.
That, too, I find an interesting situation! One worthy of exploring…
————————————————
"There are ideas that you can't understand because your language doesn't have a word for them?"
Alternatively, "because you don't know a word for it, the idea expressed is nonsense or wrong?" How is that explained, in terms of eternal, ideal objects that pre-exist linguistic expression?
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #21
@ersi: You might want to skim this article:)


The Stanford Encyclopedia is a fun resource! But, of course, I prefer what comes my way via whim, happenstance, and pointers from people I've actually talked to. My life and well-being are not dependent upon a philosophical "position" beyond common sense, I believe; so, I'm an unlikely candidate for any school…
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #22

A proof of Fermat's Last Theorem exists, before anyone has created it, and -on your tack- the theorem was always true, even though it might have been false?

There are two things: One thing is the theorem (as a real mathematical object regardless of formulation, i.e. purely ontological issue), the other is our knowledge about it (epistemological issue). Our determination of truth or falsity crucially depends on whether we know about the theorem and how well we know about it (i.e. purely epistemological issue). If we don't know about the theorem, it doesn't per se change anything about the ontology of the theorem. Rather, it makes the question about its truth or falsity nonsensical. When there's a part of ontology that we have no clue about, and someone asks us about its truth or falsity, then the question fails to connect for us. That's it.


Wouldn't you have to say that it couldn't have been false? In that case, of what matter are mathematical proofs? Are they all-but pointless exercises, only meant to convince the recalcitrant mind of that which could and should have been merely apprehended?

The purpose of proofs is practical. First, when your mind is sluggish with the sort of things as the theorem, you will have to clarify its truth or falsity to yourself by means of meticulous thought process, perhaps verifying on paper too, and arrive at a conclusion. This is the phase of proving it to yourself. Then, if you are an academic and your job is to present the proof you arrived at, you have to lay out the complete formulation on paper, to prove it to others too. Practical purposes, you see.


You seem to conflate musings and (un-warranted) beliefs with proofs… Let's try a thought-experiment:
Can you know something that isn't true?

Your question has at least two meanings, which itself can only happen due to conflation. You do it often. But let's try an answer in good faith.

The first meaning: There's something untrue, but I falsely believe it to be true.
This would indeed be an un-warranted belief. However, due to the reality of objects of belief, any false belief can be proven wrong eventually. On the outset, all un-warranted beliefs can be avoided, or detected early enough and corrected, with a properly trained intellect that runs the process of discovery of truths smoothly and flawlessly.

The second meaning: There's something that isn't true (and/or doesn't exist?) and I know for sure that this is so.
From your nominalist point of view, you probably think you are throwing a dilemma at me, because if something isn't true (and/or doesn't exist?) then how can I "know", i.e. detect? The answer is that, from the human point of view, knowledge is not existence. Knowledge is ABOUT existence. Knowledge occurs when you *wrap your mind around* something. This something exists, and when you wrap your mind around it, you acquire a mirror image of it. This mirror image in the mind is called knowledge. Like in a real mirror, the image of reality is really perceptible in the mind (by introspection) and, if the mirror (mind) is perfect, the reflection will be perfect, termed true.

Now, let's suppose there's sufficiently true knowledge of a sufficiently extensive scope in my mind this way, and that my mind reflects reality well enough. Then you throw a dubious statement at me, or a false thought enters my mind by whichever means. How do I "know" it's false? On some reflection, it doesn't fit the picture, that's how. There's already some carefully crafted picture in the mind, and if the new idea doesn't fit, it "feels" out of place and calls for examination. If the examination is honest, then I consider both the prior image and the new idea impartially and then I decide on either correction/clarification of the image or rejection of the new idea.

And the dilemma of the falsity's existence (the implicit question How can false/untrue/nonexistent things exist?) doesn't even enter the picture, because the false statement or idea is firmly on the mirror-image side of things, not on the existence side. Like in case of a real mirror, the mind-as-mirror itself exists, whereas the image in it is just a reflection. The image is perceptible, but not real the way the reflected existence is. Got it?


So, which is it? Is the theorem more like a dog or more like a "dog"? I'd want to argue, the latter…

To me it's a false dichotomy. E.g. 1 is neither purely the digit nor purely the intended meaning of the digit. When arguing which one is really there, then the realist argument goes that if there's no reality corresponding to the digit, then the digit can only be meaningless, in which case the digit may be there, detectable and visible, but without the meaning it has no value. From the digit alone, without any context, you don't know if to interpret it as "one" or "I", a misprint or a random unintended scratch on paper, or avoid any interpretation altogether. Yet, inasmuch as the digit has a meaning, there's a corresponding reality to which the digit refers to. And any reality, meaningfully defined, stays real regardless if we mention it or not.

In conclusion, from the realist perspective, the bigger reality is on the meaning side, not on the statement side. To make the mirror analogy again: Language, statements, formulations is not the reality, but a reflection of reality.

You could say that there's an enormous practical task of matching language with reality to be done individually, but, to be really realistic and practical, let's consider the vocabulary, syntax, and semantics of any given language that we grew up with as possibly being about reality. Our language mostly works and gets us through life well enough, and it's wrong (i.e. in need of correction) only inasmuch as inconsistencies are revealed. Then again, unworkable conclusions of the analysis, e.g. proposed deletion of whole word classes, such as adjectives, is a practical inconsistency itself, impairing communication which is the true purpose of language, and therefore such conclusions must be considered self-defeating wrong results, themselves in need of correction and subject to further checking against reality. The realist perspective naturally states that the tabula rasa thesis is false, unworkable.


Indeed, wouldn't you have to say that 2 + 2 = 5 is a mathematical object no less than 2 + 2 = 4 is, rather than simply saying that it is false?

Once again, let's draw the distinctions. 2+2=5 and 2+2=4 may be perfectly equal when considered without their meanings, as mere scribble on paper. But when considered against their meanings, then it can be seen (and proven) that 2+2=4 makes sense and has a true meaning, i.e. it has its context, it's in harmony with the rest of arithmetics, whereas 2+2=5, considered with its possible meaning, can be seen (and proven) to have no meaning, no purpose. Further, to keep asserting 2+2=5 alongside with 2+2=4 leads to inconsistency, and the acceptance of 2+2=5 by some individual will create REAL confusion in the mind of the individual, until rectified. It will be an extremely lucky individual who believes 2+2=5 but NEVER lands in a situation where he has to make use of the knowledge and is proven wrong. Extremely lucky and extremely unlikely.

Knowledge is no mystery at all. Ignorance is a bit of a mystery, but becomes manageable as soon as you affirm and confirm the existence of your own mind and make the effort to observe its workings. Ignorance is imperfections in the mind. False statements, doubts, dilemmas, etc. are real imperfections in the mind which is intended to be the reflector of reality. A bad mirror reflects badly and may show things that are not there. The cure to this is honest and careful self-correction.


Is then this mysterious realm of existence filled with objects each individually and indistinguishably privileged? In other words, the Is of predication is, indeed, the Is of existence…?

It's the Is of reflection. The reflector is real. And the mirror image is perceptible, i.e. real enough to be reckoned with. It's not real in the same sense as existence, but real enough for practical purposes, because without it you'd have a blank mind, you wouldn't function in the society, i.e. you wouldn't exist for practical purposes.

Ever walked into a huge glass door thinking that nothing is there? Or into a mirror thinking it's the door to another room? Mirrors and glasses are no joke, I'm telling you, if by some miracle you haven't found this out already.



To elaborate (rather than just refer you to my shelf at the Universal Library…), we'd likely agree that "2 + 2 = 5" is false, and that "'2 + 2 = 5' is false" is true.
What we mean by the former is that 2 + 2 does not equal 5; by the latter, the same. No? How, then, to explain the discovery of "2 + 2 = 5"?

Let's go over the distinction again. There are two statements:

A. 2+2=5
B. '2+2=5' is false.

As scribble on paper or as bits on the interwebz, both A and B are statements on a par. But when considered against their meanings - which for you seems to be embedded in and inseparable from the statements, but to me is easily separable for analysis - one of these "makes sense", "rings true", "matches the facts" or such, whereas the other doesn't. And that's all there is to truth: It makes sense in analysis so solidly that it can be determined to fit reality.

One more analogy to demonstrate how meaning is analytically separable. Consider two paper labels. On one it says CAT, on the other it says DOG. So, we have two labels:

A. CAT
B. DOG

On the face of it, which one is true and which one is false? The truth/falsity doesn't even enter the picture! The question is nonsensical! This holds both with your A and B above, and my A and B here. The truth/falsity enters the picture only against further context.

Now the further context. Let's say there's a dog in the lab where we are doing our experiment with the paper labels. Since we are dealing with paper labels here, we can with equal ease attach either label on the dog. Finally, placed on the dog, the label CAT (given that our language is English) can be said to be false, whereas the label DOG is said to be true.

Similarly, even your "'2+2=5' is false" has zero truth value as long as it has not been matched against an analytically separable reality. If you are not able to analytically consider that reality, it is, from realist perspective, a REAL defect of your intellect, namely a lack of analytical skills.

Metaphysical realism leads to the commitment of psychological realism. I take this commitment seriously. Evidently you (that's you, Oakdale) hate this kind of commitment, so you prefer to fool around with other kinds of metaphysics with near-complete lack of commitment, more suitable to your character.

--------
Thanks for some explanation of the way logic works for you. Let's go over that too.


I only require that one's premises require one's conclusion; from there, we can talk about the reasons for accepting or rejecting those premises. From numerous examples, I've determined that you require others to accept your premises…

Actually, it's the same for both of us. You are simply too prejudiced. Here's how:

The conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. If the premises are committal (i.e. the premises are conclusions of separate autonomous syllogisms), then so is the conclusion.

You can find me saying here that I am not here to convince anyone. I am here merely demonstrating on what grounds I adhere to what I adhere to.

It's true that I adhere to my conclusions based on the premises I hold. At the same time, I realise that someone else may hold completely different premises. Would you say I am enforcing my premises on you or rather that I am explaining my premises to you? At no point do I demand you accept my premises. I only lay them out for you, while at the same time I go through the work of identifying your premises, inasmuch as you fail to lay them out of your own accord.

I am ready to reconsider my premises as soon as better premises are provided, but this *requires* that you explicitly lay your premises out for comparison and critical scrutiny. Same as you, I am not accepting anything uncritically and won't reconsider anything uncritically either. It's just common sense.


Didn't De Saussure argue that the meaning of particular words in particular languages were essentially arbitrary?

Arbitrary doesn't mean the same as random or inconsequential. Language is a formal system. On one hand it's formal, i.e. its components are a mere formality, but on the other it's a system, i.e. the components must be ordered systematically, coherently, in a structured way. Hence structuralism. It's a completely analytical philosophy.

In a very broad sense it essentially doesn't matter if the dog is called "dog", "Hund", "chien", or whatever, but the word in question becomes relevant as soon as you consider the rest of the vocabulary, phonology, morphology, orthography, etc. in the language. When you consider language as such (like Kant's Ding an sich), the particular word is just a symbolic notation replaceable with anything, but as soon as you enter the level of particular languages, say English, it makes a crucial difference if you say "dog" or "chien".

Here's what Saussure actually meant. Over generations, words change shape, particularly pronunciation changes, and semantic shifts occur in any particular language and in this sense the relationship of a word and its meaning is arbitrary, because the shape of the word itself is ultimately arbitrary. This is called the diachronic (historical) dimension of language. However, whenever you speak to someone else, you are employing the synchronic dimesion of the language, using it as a means of communication with the current and immediately adjacent generations, in which case it makes quite a difference whether you utter "dog" or "chien" or something in between.

So, your problem is focusing on *arbitrary*, forgetting how it works in the system. You get attached to isolated words, forgetting what they mean in context. When you deliberately toy this way with language long enough, it may result (I'd say has already resulted) in lack of structured and methodical thinking.

Consequently, this -

Which is to say, your "in my native language it's a strict impossibility to use 'invent' in this way. Logic and its glory can only be a discovery, not invention" is mere ignorance or subterfuge on your part: You can't claim that the distinction is not permitted, because "your" language -so far as you know- doesn't have a ready-to-hand expression for it!

- doesn't follow.


How would you gain an un-impeded access [to knowledge]? Who or what were you impeded by? And why…?

How to gain access? Practise methodical thinking. Know that the way you think has a real effect on your mind. The mind is real, knowledge is its real content, and the existence of that about which your knowledge is is also real.


Or are you content to say your language is best, mine inferior;

Wrong can be proven wrong. Wrong occurs in case of inferior thinking. Edit: It's not the language per se which is wrong. It's the way you use it. Just like food in itself is neither good or bad, but overeating or malnutrition make the difference.


hence, you don't need to understand what I'm saying to refute it?

When you can't explain what you're saying, it's its own self-refutation.


There's a reason why most mystics are hermits…

Indeed, because knowledge is ultimately about what's really there, not about what can be argued to be there. Ultimate knowledge is a strictly individual quest.


Alternatively, "because you don't know a word for it, the idea expressed is nonsense or wrong?" How is that explained, in terms of eternal, ideal objects that pre-exist linguistic expression?

Nobody's a tabula rasa. There's always something pre-existing in the image of the mind, and the new concept looks for its place somewhere and it can fit appropriately, making the mind with its images a better navigation tool in reality - or it can be proven inappropriate.

From the point of view of the individual, knowledge is a dynamic process. Since I don't have the same prejudices against the syllogism as you, I am able to learn by means of them. Structuralism provides a much deeper and flexible insight, but you have not even grasped the significance of the syllogism yet. Marred by prejudice against the syllogism as it is, your exposition of sentential logic unfortunately didn't come across as much of an exposition. Perhaps you can try again - on your own, not by making me read stuff that may be interesting, but don't really contribute to the discussion.

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #23
So:
Now there's a mirror-reality that "reflects" the real reality. It's objects, reflections, are sometimes almost as real as the real reality; but sometimes the mirror is just an analogy... One compares what one sees in the mirror with what one sees in reality and, if the objects compared are similar, congruent or otherwise good reflections (simpatico?), then we've correctly apprehended the real reality?
Except, perhaps, when the mirror is only an analogy...

How does one see this interior mirror, let alone see in it? Of course, "see" is just an analogy? No light needed, but there's likely an inner eye... Really real objects shine! Is that it?

You've done an admirable job of explaining -to yourself- why and how your system is consistent, using the tools of ambiguity and unwarranted reification... That is, the terms you accept into your premises are necessary to your system but their justification is precisely and only such necessity: Coherence. But because of how you'd use them their meanings shift about, will-he, nil-he: So, your system's coherence is an illusion.
However satisfying it may be, as a tool or physic to quiet your mind, it is not knowledge but belief... And, as such, capable of easy and telling criticism and incapable of adequate defense.
But surely you know this!

(I'm sorry this seems so negative... I tired of marking the many words whose meanings vacillated, so it could have been worse! :)  But I don't expect you to be much bothered by it: You have a closed, incoherent system that satisfies you somehow, and -as you said- you won't reject it until and unless you are presented with another that you're convinced is better... That is, one that provides the same satisfactions. Put plainly: You prefer the error you know to a pursuit of a piece-meal truth.)
 
Nobody's a tabula rasa. There's always something pre-existing in the image of the mind, and the new concept looks for its place somewhere and it can fit appropriately, making the mind with its images a better navigation tool in reality - or it can be proven inappropriate.
I'd agree with the first sentence. But, as usual, you have images, ambulatory and discriminating concepts; or inappropriate ones that play you false, pigeon holes ready made, and an "outside" reality -- how exactly do you justify that?
No, never mind: Unless your answer is It just is! you'd have problems with your system, beyond those that you already ignore. And if that is your answer, you haven't offered one, really.
Ohm!
进行 ...
"Humor is emotional chaos remembered in tranquility." - James Thurber
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts!" - Richard Feynman
 (iBook G4 - Panther | Mac mini i5 - El Capitan)

Re: Philosophy, Logic, Formal Systems

Reply #24
You've done an admirable job of explaining -to yourself- why and how your system is consistent, using the tools of ambiguity and unwarranted reification... That is, the terms you accept into your premises are necessary to your system but their justification is precisely and only such necessity: Coherence. But because of how you'd use them their meanings shift about, will-he, nil-he: So, your system's coherence is an illusion.

He smashed your argumentation entirely Oakdale. Simple as that.
I admire his patience as well as his methodical reasoning in order to do such a crystal clear formulation.
Congratulations, ersi. That was an extraordinary post.

Pay attention, gentlemen, Oakdale's not beaten. He just started the last round with a French Savate technique, "Now there's a mirror-reality that "reflects" the real reality"... how will ersi react to that? another series of demolishing jabs? :)

Stay tuned... this is a heavy weight combat brought to you by DnD. :)
A matter of attitude.