The Problem with Atheism

In philosophy and logic, when you "make up", then it comes to be. It means it will exist. And its seeds are already here and now.

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My argument, therefore, is: Be very careful what you make up, because it *will* become reality, if it already isn't.

That's all trivially true, because of course the synapses in your brain are real. That doesn't mean the synapses correspond to real things outside of your brain. It's also the very reason people should have a strongly vested interest in eradicating false beliefs. Steven Weinberg wrote, "for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." That's true insofar as religion corresponds to false beliefs. But any false belief will do, and one needn't be religious to hold a false belief.

1. Is the "potentially empirically detectable teapot" the same teapot that Russell referred to?

Yes. I phrased it that way at your insistence.

2. If yes, did the outsider detect it or not?

Of course not.

3. If not, then how does the outsider know that it's just a silly teapot?

How do you know it's silly if I say I've got five million china teapots at home?

Disregarding all about detection and granting that the "insiders" have a different idea of the teapot than the outsider - how do you determine that the outsider's view is correct? And when you have a way of determining this, doesn't this make *you* the true impartial otsider rather than the outsider your argument is referring to? Isn't the outsider of your argument enmeshed in his own ideas about other things with regard to which he is an insider? In other words, how do you define the outsider? An example/analogy would be helpful, thanks.

http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Outsider_test

Re: The Problem with Atheism

Reply #84 – 2013-12-17, 10:33:34

That's all trivially true, because of course the synapses in your brain are real. That doesn't mean the synapses correspond to real things outside of your brain. It's also the very reason people should have a strongly vested interest in eradicating false beliefs. Steven Weinberg wrote, "for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." That's true insofar as religion corresponds to false beliefs. But any false belief will do, and one needn't be religious to hold a false belief.

What if you hold false beliefs? How would you revise them? For example, I find your implicit suggestion that "synapses in your brain" correspond to beliefs as open to immediate attack. How do you justify this contention? Any evidence? If it turns out dubious, would you revise it?

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-15, 21:49:10
1. Is the "potentially empirically detectable teapot" the same teapot that Russell referred to?

Yes. I phrased it that way at your insistence.

I most definitely didn't ask you to formulate it this way. What was wrong with some formulation more true to Russell's? Was he wrong after all? If so, why not admit it and revise your belief?

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-15, 21:49:10
3. If not, then how does the outsider know that it's just a silly teapot?

How do you know it's silly if I say I've got five million china teapots at home?

By logical inference from knowing you and knowing what china is. Note: The basis for the judgement would be knowledge, not ignorance. This is inverted in your case.

http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Outsider_test

If this test is meant to eliminate bias, then it fails miserably. It is specifically designed to attack traditional religion, not religion in general. It's not a test of rationality. It's applicable only to adherents of traditional religion. Converts don't qualify and atheists don't qualify either. Hence we both don't qualify here. It's irrational of you to refer to this test. It's inapplicable here. Its connection with Russell's analogy (the analogy that is either false or meant as a joke, most likely both) also remains unexplained.

Very disappointing. Follow your own advice and consider a complete overhaul of your methodology.

Re: The Problem with Atheism

Reply #85 – 2013-12-17, 15:52:06

What if you hold false beliefs? How would you revise them? For example, I find your implicit suggestion that "synapses in your brain" correspond to beliefs as open to immediate attack. How do you justify this contention? Any evidence? If it turns out dubious, would you revise it?

If you're ignorant of basic neuroscience, here's a semi-random place to start: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aphasia Semi-random because you could say Broca was the first neuroscientist, or at least the most famous early one, and that's what he studied.

My "implicit suggestion" was more of a pars pro toto. If there was an implicit suggestion, it's that it's all wholly and completely physical. Would I revise that suggestion if it turned out to be dubious? Well, why wouldn't I?

I most definitely didn't ask you to formulate it this way. What was wrong with some formulation more true to Russell's? Was he wrong after all? If so, why not admit it and revise your belief?

You're clearly still missing the point about the evolution of ideas. Okay, so there's a teapot in space undetectable by telescope. And as you indicated, a teapot undetectable by telescope might still be detectable by e.g. sending over some kind of space vessel. This changes what exactly? Even adding the undetectable by telescope attribute is already part of the evolution.

By logical inference from knowing you and knowing what china is. Note: The basis for the judgement would be knowledge, not ignorance. This is inverted in your case.

That's the only potentially valid objection to the teapot you've managed to muster thus far: we know a thing or two about teapots. The teapot argument presumes that knowledge about teapots to be correct, while that's actually the point it sets out to prove. However, you feign knowledge where there is none, which is the problem I've been pointing out all along.

It's not a test of rationality.

I've seen Christians quite rationally tear down Islamic concepts without realizing much the same arguments would dismantle their own faith. Sure, there are some caveats, but it's all about not applying a double standard.

It's not a test of rationality. It's applicable only to adherents of traditional religion. Converts don't qualify and atheists don't qualify either. Hence we both don't qualify here.

The point is to subject your own beliefs to the same amount of skepticism and rational inquiry that you do others. Your contention that converts and atheists already do is special pleading.

Its connection with Russell's analogy (the analogy that is either false or meant as a joke, most likely both) also remains unexplained.

You think it's an analogy to your god concept, but it's an analogy to its infancy and to its development.

The connection is that this is how it sounds to outsiders. You obviously don't think it's ridiculous, so one has to come up with something everyone thinks is ridiculous to demonstrate. Is it a joke? Maybe, but a joke with utility.

Re: The Problem with Atheism

Reply #86 – 2013-12-17, 18:35:49

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-17, 10:33:34
What if you hold false beliefs? How would you revise them? For example, I find your implicit suggestion that "synapses in your brain" correspond to beliefs as open to immediate attack. How do you justify this contention? Any evidence? If it turns out dubious, would you revise it?

If you're ignorant of basic neuroscience, here's a semi-random place to start: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aphasia Semi-random because you could say Broca was the first neuroscientist, or at least the most famous early one, and that's what he studied.

My "implicit suggestion" was more of a pars pro toto. If there was an implicit suggestion, it's that it's all wholly and completely physical. Would I revise that suggestion if it turned out to be dubious? Well, why wouldn't I?

I know enough about neuroscience to know that nobody has ever detected a belief in the brain or observed revisions of beliefs in terms of synapses in the brain.

Also, I know about psychology. Aphasia is a defect of communication. Communication is distinct from reflection and self-reflection. Beliefs are of the reflective and self-reflective sort primarily, and of communicative sort only secondarily. How? You can hide your true motivation by your expression and behaviour, you can deceive people as to your true loyalties. That's how.

So, your example was not just semi-random. It was completely random, and unfortunately inapplicable.

You're clearly still missing the point about the evolution of ideas. Okay, so there's a teapot in space undetectable by telescope. And as you indicated, a teapot undetectable by telescope might still be detectable by e.g. sending over some kind of space vessel. This changes what exactly? Even adding the undetectable by telescope attribute is already part of the evolution.

Evolution of ideas is connected to (un)detectability how? Are true ideas detected? Detected as what? As synapses in the brain? Can you bring an example? (Aphasia was inapplicable. Let's have an applicable example.)

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-17, 10:33:34
By logical inference from knowing you and knowing what china is. Note: The basis for the judgement would be knowledge, not ignorance. This is inverted in your case.

That's the only potentially valid objection to the teapot you've managed to muster thus far: we know a thing or two about teapots. The teapot argument presumes that knowledge about teapots to be correct, while that's actually the point it sets out to prove. However, you feign knowledge where there is none, which is the problem I've been pointing out all along.

I feign knowledge where there is none? You are open to the same charge. You feign knowledge that your "potentially empirically detectable" teapot is unreal, but there is a crucial distinction between undetected (i.e. not yet known, but knowable in principle) and unknowable (whatever this may be, Russell's analogy is not about this and neither is your formulation). You are not talking about unknowable. You are talking about *potentially detectable* while pretending it's the same thing as unreal!

Here's how the distinction is important. Potentially detectable may be, for example, a faint whiff of wind that your skin may not feel if it's insensitive enough but that may cause e.g. a feeble leaf to move. If you don't notice the leaf, the potentially detectable whiff of wind will remain undetected by you. If you notice the leaf, the potentially detectable whiff of wind becomes empirical reality for you. However, even if you don't detect it, it's an empirical reality that you failed to detect. It's not unreal either way. It's flawed logic to conflate undetected with unreal. This is even a scientifically important distinction. In math, infinitesimals are not zeroes.

Here are some more metaphysical distinctions (just to show you what I think about stuff, if you are really interested in dialogue. If not, you can safely ignore this. Or you can refute or ridicule these distinctions, whichever way you want it.). Unknowable does not mean unreal. Unreal means *does not exist*. Unknowable exists, but it escapes empirical detection and grasp of mind for whatever reasons.

Then there are also empirically undetectable knowables. Concepts (e.g. beliefs!) are of this sort - knowable and thus existent, but empirically undetected. Math (and any other science and laws of nature) are also knowable, but empirically undetectable (not even potentially empirically detectable). You can't detect abstract circularity or the number 0, 1, -1 or pi. Coherent mental activity (logical inference and deduction) is a form of detection, if you insist, but unempirical. You can't mechanically/electronically record and reproduce a trail of thought in a person. Evolution is not empirically detected in nature. Evolution is a conclusion from facts of nature that seem to imply evolution. There are empirically detected facts of nature for which the best explanation may be evolution, but you can't take evolution and put it on someone's table to "prove" it to him. You can show the facts and hope the facts lead him to the same conclusion. The facts are empirical, but evolution is an unempirical knowable.

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-17, 10:33:34
It's not a test of rationality.

I've seen Christians quite rationally tear down Islamic concepts without realizing much the same arguments would dismantle their own faith. Sure, there are some caveats, but it's all about not applying a double standard.

Good. Let's stick to avoiding double standards.

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-17, 10:33:34
It's not a test of rationality. It's applicable only to adherents of traditional religion. Converts don't qualify and atheists don't qualify either. Hence we both don't qualify here.

The point is to subject your own beliefs to the same amount of skepticism and rational inquiry that you do others. Your contention that converts and atheists already do is special pleading.

More crucial distinctions. Born atheists have evidently not exercised skepticism to the extent that they'd have converted, right? So, if the test is to be impartial, it should invite conversion in both directions, right?

Then there's a class of people that may superficially fail the test, yet be perfectly rational, namely those whose beliefs have undergone and withstood all tests of time, inquiry, adequacy, utility. What kind of outsider would be able to evaluate this? Let's say you are evaluating me in this interaction. Do I seem like someone who has not questioned his own beliefs and reasoned his way towards a systematic world view? Someone at loss with answers? Someone easily refuted? In turn, I don't see you too keen to revise or improve your beliefs when they don't carry too far in argumentation.

Quote from: ersi on 2013-12-17, 10:33:34
Its connection with Russell's analogy (the analogy that is either false or meant as a joke, most likely both) also remains unexplained.

You think it's an analogy to your god concept, but it's an analogy to its infancy and to its development.

It's not how Russell meant it, but I understand that you want to argue it this way. Okay, allowed.