Where debating everything under the sun is only the beginning

For starters, there’s little obvious connection between the U.S. trade balance and economic output (gross domestic product). As shown in the chart below from a recent Cato essay on the trade balance, the relationship between higher trade surpluses (or smaller deficits) and higher GDP growth is practically nonexistent. Economist Don Boudreaux and former Sen. Phil Gramm dug through additional periods in a recent Wall Street Journal column and concluded that “etween 1890 and 2024, it is impossible to find a statistically significant correlation between America’s trade balance and its economic growth.”

Your trade adviser, Peter Navarro, says 90 deals in 90 days is possible. We're now 13 days into the point from when you lifted the reciprocal, the discounted reciprocal tariffs. There's zero deals so far. Why is that?

No, there’s many deals.

When are they going to be announced?

You have to understand, I'm dealing with all the companies, very friendly countries. We're meeting with China. We're doing fine with everybody. But ultimately, I've made all the deals.

Not one has been announced yet. When are you going to announce them?

I’ve made 200 deals.

You said you would end the war in Ukraine on Day One.

Well, I said that figuratively, and I said that as an exaggeration, because to make a point, and you know, it gets, of course, by the fake news [unintelligible]. Obviously, people know that when I said that, it was said in jest, but it was also said that it will be ended.

Well what’s taking so long? When do you think it will be ended?

Well, I don’t think it’s long. I mean, look, I got here three months ago. This war has been going on for three years. It's a war that would have never happened if I was president. It's Biden's war. It’s not my war. I have nothing to do with it.

Most notably, Russia seeks a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and potentially beyond.47 But gains in Ukraine notwithstanding, Russia has struggled to turn that vision into reality and lacks the economic or military power to aim far beyond its periphery for the foreseeable future. Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is approximately 10 times smaller than that of our allies in Europe and Canada,48 and although Moscow has generated significant combat power in Ukraine, as long as this economic imbalance persists, Russia will be unable to generate and sustain the military power required to seize control of large portions of Europe as the Soviets did or otherwise impose its will on Europe in the face of determined resistance.

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However, NATO has weakened considerably in recent decades as a result of allied free-riding. This is evident in the collapse of NATO allies’ defense spending after the Cold War.

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The United States must therefore work closely with its allies to strengthen NATO so that the Alliance can do what is required to defend Europe even as U.S. forces focus first on defending the U.S. homeland and denying China’s imperial ambitions.

Finally, NATO has spoken in recent years about doing more in the Indo-Pacific64 —but this is folly. NATO’s priority is and must remain Europe’s defense. Moreover, even if NATO allies wish to help the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the best way for them to do so (with very rare exceptions) is not by directing their own attention and resources to that theater at Europe’s expense, but by taking primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense while the United States focuses its own forces on the China threat. The United States should urge NATO allies to act accordingly.

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This does not mean that the United States should abandon other theaters or allies, however. Instead, the United States must find ways to defend U.S. interests in those theaters without jeopardizing the ability of U.S. forces to defend the U.S. homeland and deny China’s imperial ambitions, which are higher priorities. To that end, Washington should empower allies and partners to lead efforts to defend against Russia, Iran, and North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support. This will allow us to avoid cascading escalation by ensuring that allies and partners can deter opportunistic aggression even if key U.S. forces are drawn away from their respective regions, for instance, to deter or defeat Chinese aggression. And it will leave U.S. alliances and partnerships far stronger than they have been at any time in the post–Cold War era.

Edit: Here's what's more likely going on.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDSz62i6F3Q

Calling it "The Trump Doctrine" highlights the largest problem. Trump is not on board, and while naming flattery is cheap and possibly effective, clearly he has other interests and whims directly detrimental to this "Trump Doctrine". The tariff war is a good example, weakening rather than strengthening this strategy.