It seems time to repost the reminder from the original thread. It had a lot about Muslims, Vivaldi is still running on beer, and this thread has taken an environmental turn. All fine, but it should be about the world starting 15 years 11 months and 3 days from now.
Opera forums are partially covered by the Web Archive, including this thread. The newer Vivaldi threads are not, so the Vivaldi 2030 thread seems gone. This one is still here of course.
Saw there a group I had completely forgotten about, with reason it seems, The Next Eleven.
And to answer the burning question in topic start, we seem to have reached (at least temporarily) peak beer in 2013. Higher likelihood of less beer than more beer, but not definitive yet.
This thread has now crossed a half-way point. It was created 2014-01-24. Today is 2022-11-01, 3203 days later (or the thread was created 8 years, 9 months, 8 days ago).
2030-01-01 will come in 7 years, 2 months (or in 2618 days).
Going back to the original Opera forum, it was created 2001-09-11, 7721 days ago. 7721 days from now will be the date 2043-12-22.
Biggest remaining issue is if Bolsonaro wants to do a Trump.
Congratulations to da Silva and to Brazil. I would not say da Silva is my favourite politician by any means, but you could do far worse, and very nearly did this election.
The Italian code seems to indicate fine and/or confiscation. Possibly, eventually.
Quote
Italy The violation of financial sanctions adopted either by the EU or Italy implies the application of administrative fines and may also imply criminal liability (for individuals only), to the extent that the Public Prosecutor finds that the violation is also of a criminal nature. As to the relevant administrative fines, the following penalties apply:
violating the prohibition of using/disposing of frozen assets or of making, directly or indirectly, funds/resources available to designated persons is punishable by a fine of Euro 5,000 up to Euro 500,000; the same fine applies in case of a deliberate participation in activities whose objective is to circumvent, directly or indirectly, an assets freeze;
breach by institutions and entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations of their duty to communicate details of the assets freeze measures adopted and of the amount and nature of frozen assets is punishable by a fine of Euro 500 up to Euro 25,000;
any other violations of EU Regulations imposing restrictive measures or economic sanctions or the violation of the reporting duty/request of authorizations by member States is punishable by a fine of Euro 5,000 up to Euro 500,000.
The above-listed administrative fines can be increased up to three times for serious, repeated and/or systematic violations. Moreover, as said above, the relevant conduct may be prosecuted as a criminal offence to the extent that it falls within the scope of one of the offenses set out in the Italian Criminal Code. In particular, providing financial resources to persons/entities designated under the sanctions regime targeting terrorism may ultimately lead to a sentence of up to 15 years imprisonment, regardless of whether those resources were used for terroristic acts.
In addition, the Ministry of Economy and Finance can order the seizure of the items used or intended to commit the violation.
Legislative Decree No. 109/2007—in connection with Law No. 689/1981—also provides that in the event that the above mentioned violations are committed by a director/employee of a legal entity, both the individual and the entity are severally liable, even where those who materially committed the violation are not univocally identifiable.
Administrative fines applied according to Legislative Decree No. 109/2007 can be challenged according to Law No. 689/1981.
These are oligarchs by themselves, not agents in somebody else's pocket.
Someone like Musk does have massive business interests in China. I'd imagine he wouldn't want to rock the boat too much if he can help it.
Sure. Being an oligarch does not necessarily mean being completely sovereign, even though some oligarchs imagine themselves to be such. Musk (and more so Murdoch) is a businessman, some moves a are bad for his business so he either does not do those moves or attempts to undo them when he discovers it was a mistake.
Ever since Berlusconi pocketed enough telemedia he thinks he is invulnerable, which is quite justified thinking on his part, because he has really been through everything basically unscathed, retaining all the liberties and access to power, and is now 86 years old, i.e. a life lived merrily and still ongoing.
In contrast, all Russian oligarchs are Putin's vassals who must sacrifice own wealth for him when the time is at hand, which is right now. The most sovereign oligarch is Putin himself. Schröder is a well-paid foreign agent, not some unwitting useful idiot. Schröder's case qualifies for treason 100%.
Question is, does Musk do Putin's bidding, or does Putin do Musk's bidding?
Things keep happening to Starlink competitors like underseas communication cables.
Nothing Schröder has done (that we know of) in government or after is illegal in any jurisdiction. Sure there has never been a fossil fuel project he didn't approve of or pushed for, but whatever the views we might have on that, shilling for the fossil industry is perfectly legal.
Orban hasn't broken any Hungarian laws either, again that we know of.
We cannot stop lobbying in general, that would mean preventing politicians and decision makers from talking to anyone. We can make it more transparent, registers and the like, and prevent some from lobbying. Bribery is illegal of course, and if Berlusconi was Swedish, those bottles of vodka would become property of the Swedish government.
Blocking based on nationality doesn't work. Clearly Putin has agents of influence in the US, in Europe, in the rest of the world, and they are not Russian. "Influence washing" is easy. You could easily get someone to influence a news medium/social medium and they could do on their own accord and for their own interests. That medium in turn could influence/blackmail the politician. Murdoch is an agent of influence, with massive influence in the English-speaking world. Or for that matter Musk.
Berlusconi is example good enough. Media power led to immense wealth and political power. What's in his interest is not in Italy's interest, but it is what is in his interest that counts when he is in power.
Schröder seems to be in company with Tony Blair, with what seems to be the harshest punishment available for politicians: Ostracism. Blair was arguably the most successful British Labour politician since forever, until he joined forces with Bush. He makes plenty on the Circuit, but politically speaking he's dead.
Likewise expect Trump to spend 0 days in prison, and while the accumulated years in prison from the occupation of Congress last year can be measured in lifetimes, expect no politicians and nary a henchman to spend any time among them.
Berlusconi did end up having to do four hours of "work" as community service for a year. Heinz-Christian Strache, on tape actually planning crimes, ended up having to resign, later working as a Putin intermediary. Netanyahu's case is ongoing, but seems headed for a Berlusconi-like community service. Speaking of Israel, ex-president Katsav did end up with five years in prison for rape in the second round, thus avoiding the dreaded community service of the first round. In France Chirac got two years suspended prison, Sarkozy is facing two years suspended, one year not. That case is ongoing. While in Malta Joseph Muscat had to resign. North Macedonia's Nikola Gruevski is convicted to prison, but he has to be extradited from Hungary first. For US Americans, Wikipedia made a list.
Schröder clearly hasn't done anything illegal, that we know of. Beijing a lobbyist isn't illegal. Being paid by Putin (or Kim og Xi or whoever) isn't illegal. Should more be done to uncover illegal activities by politicians and other PEPs, or should we instead restrict which activities can be done legally? Not against either, but I don't think in that case we should repeat the US mistake of criminalising foreign agents of influence, while the domestic ones are scot-free.
Accurate anyhow, not so sure how amazing it was. An invasion at any scale would drive the wedge deeper between Russia and Ukraine, and further shift public opinion in Ukraine. Of the three camps, Anti-Russian, Pro-Russian, and don't care, the third may have been the largest, and it has now withered, Pro-Russians have weakened even in previously occupied territories, and Anti-Russian sentiments are now presumably persistent, even after Putin. People who used to identify as Russian now identify as Russian-speaking Ukrainians.
As for Turkey, the Azerbaijani attack on Armenia,, just like the 2020 war, had to happen with the support of Erdogan.
That may have been that. Aliyev may have believed his star to be rising, with Turkey more influential, Russia preoccupied in Ukraine, and EU desperate for Azerbaijani gas. But the pointlessness of the Azerbaijani attack combined with curiously timed trouble in Central Asia, leads to the theory that Putin may have been in on it too.
Obviously "politically correct feminists" are not thrilled with Meloni (nor obviously Berlusconi nor Salvini).
SD will not be "in government with" M (the Swedish conservatives), KD (Christian Democrats) and L[iberals], they will be the parliamentary base for that putative government. Which may not sound as such a big deal, but the leader joined when SD was a tiny Nazi parti decades ago, and changed it to a denazified and more electable one, though doubts remains about their honorable intentions. Sweden and Swedes are not really under threat, but the party is big enough to make once orderly Swedish politics a mess. Since they cleverly avoid being in power, they probably can avoid any disastrous blunder and remain big enough to keep Swedish politics messy. (And today the SD-supported three party coalition agreed to agree, so if things go well for Kristersson, he'll be the next PM on Monday.)
Not on an Italian level though, where the politics is messy both in the orderly North ("Germany with good food") and the more idiosyncratic South.
Putin is indeed the biggest question mark. Bit like the "now Nazi are the SD leaders really?", how anti-Putin is Meloni when it comes down to it? The other two definitely aren't.
Countries don't have to join the EU if they don't want to, but there is no reason to exclude them if they do fulfil the requirements, and those requirements are not lower than they were when earlier entrants joined.
And there would have to be different rules when the EU approaches 40 members than when it had 6 or 12. The greatest problem isn't the threshold to join, but what happens after, as Poland and Hungary have shown.
There are many potential Hungaries, particularly among the candidate countries, but also the existing members.
NATO and EU are merging in Europe. Norwegians are more seriously considering joining EU (though there is still a solid majority against). NATO is effectively "EU light" or "EU plus". How that merge actually will progress depends on external factors.
Russia lost Donbas, but then of course it was not their to lose to begin with. They do have a fighting chance of keeping Crimea, Sevastopol at least.
European rearmament means that Russia lost the Baltic Sea as well. The threat towards the Baltic States is real, but the logic of it being a NATO Achilles heel is fading. That in itself is dangerous, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a consequence of Ukraine slipping through their fingers. But first of all, the Kremlin doesn't care that much about you, secondly they are not capable of any persistent action as long as they are bogged down in Ukraine. The forever war in Donbas was a convenient vehicle to pressure Ukraine, and it still is, but now it is harming Russia as much.
The Kremlin may put their hope to the US midterms (or boon from an Italian election), but if so they will be disappointed. The presidential election could in worst case be more to their liking, but that will be three years after the invasion and these will not be good years for Russia.
Long term however Germany, not the US, will be your security guarantee. Estonia is not in the Indo-Pacific.
Germany is re-militarising. The effect will not be a militarily stronger and geopolitically more conscious European Union. The effect will be a more dangerous Germany, repeating history all over again.
As frequently noted, with increases Germany will have the largest military budget in the world, after the US and China. Sure, that is a handful of euros. The EU needs to become more German, but are the Germans themselves up to this? Indications so far are not too impressive. They have been kicking that aforementioned rust, announced that they will be buying some US equipment at inflated prices.
The European Defence Fund is more interesting for direction. It is a tiny fund (in military terms), but it shows priorities. Same goes for the European Defence Agency. I don't think Germany will be the instigator of change, but it can become a conduit.
More impactful than where Germany is going, is where the US is going. Right now the relationship could hardly be better. Arguably Biden is a better European than Macron or Scholz. That might not last beyond January 2025. Meanwhile Germany considers buying several trinkets from the US.
Der Zustand unserer Bundeswehr und der zivilen Verteidigungsstrukturen, aber auch unsere allzu große Abhängigkeit von russischer Energie sprechen dafür, dass wir uns nach Ende des Kalten Krieges in falscher Sicherheit gewiegt haben. Allzu gern haben Politik, Wirtschaft und große Teile unserer Gesellschaft weitreichende Konsequenzen aus dem Diktum eines früheren deutschen Verteidigungsministers gezogen, wonach Deutschland nur noch von Freunden umzingelt sei. Das war ein Irrtum.
Germany is re-militarising. The effect will not be a militarily stronger and geopolitically more conscious European Union. The effect will be a more dangerous Germany, repeating history all over again.
Sweden is remilitarising too. This will be very consequential assuming this will last longer than a couple years (otherwise it would just be kicking off the rust of mothballed equipment), as it most certainly will. It is fairly logical that we will remilitarise, as the conditions for demilitarising no longer hold. While it is clear there will be consequences, it is less clear what those consequences will be.
There will be opportunity costs. Partly in government spending, which will be significant, but not all that much. We'll be on a cold war footing, not on a war footing. More in the changes in attitude and strategies, and their outcomes.
Greater uncertainty lies in what this remilitarizing would consist of. Easy to say we are going to spend more money, but on what, and for what end? When?
As frequently noted, with increases Germany will have the largest military budget in the world, after the US and China. Sure, that is a handful of euros. The EU needs to become more German, but are the Germans themselves up to this? Indications so far are not too impressive. They have been kicking that aforementioned rust, announced that they will be buying some US equipment at inflated prices. That is not upgrading capabilities, that is re-defending the Fulda Gap. Of course, now we got the Suwałki Gap, but that we probably could defend anyway. Russia picks up Estonia, we pick up Königsberg. A little prisoner exchange, and status quo ante. Russia cannot win, Russia will not try.
Preparing for this would be another version of fighting the last cold war.
By default the Three Seas initiative would have succeeded in that the Baltic Sea (certainly), the Black Sea (probably) and not just the Adriatic, but entire Mediterranean would be under EU dominance. The split along the Scandinavian Keel has mended. The Nordic countries were split between the Atlantics (Norway, Iceland, Canada, US, UK; in NATO, not EU) and the Baltics (Sweden, Finland; in EU, not NATO), with Denmark more Atlantic than Baltic. The Atlantic and Baltic were distinct and disconnected zones. Now the Cap of the North, the Nordic area north of the Arctic Circle is one military zone. Germany like Denmark is both Atlantic and Baltic, more the latter. However, for the rest of this decade, Germany is unlikely to do much more than catch-up.
The European Defence Fund is more interesting for direction. It is a tiny fund (in military terms), but it shows priorities. Same goes for the European Defence Agency. I don't think Germany will be the instigator of change, but it can become a conduit.
Yes, making a legal document in one country legal in another is in the base case (superlegalislation) an extremely contorted, tedious, slow and expensive process. Even the simplified process as you described above is painful. It is bootstrapped by each country recognising that the other country exists, and by extensions its embassies, registrars and notary offices.
That you think you are qualified to translate a document does not make you qualified to do so. Your country must do so, and the embassy must vouch for the offices, originals and translations in question to the bureaucracy of the other country. If you are really lucky the other country also has to vouch for their offices, originals and translations to the bureaucracy in your country. When you are done with the process you will wish a pox on both their houses.
That is the base scenario unless there is an agreement between the countries in question to do better. There are a few conventions and treaties to do that. At heart the European Union itself is a number of treaties between countries to do better. You were just shown how it would be all the time if there hadn't been a EU or comparable treaties, and when you have to bootstrap from two countries recognising each other. (If they don't recognise each other, you are either out of luck or sometimes you can tunnel through a third country.)
You keep blaming countries' failures on other countries. That is reasonable when that blamed country has colonised or destabilised the failed country in question, but not otherwise. Russia has had a negative influence on Ukraine for instance, and can be blamed. But no, it is not the EU's fault that Moldova is a poor country.
The threshold for EU candidate is countries reasonably high, but there is no working mechanism to stop member countries from backsliding once they have joined, like Poland and Hungary. If no such mechanism is agreed on Ukraine's membership can be long in waiting.
Russia has not been and will not be a member of the EU simply due to size.
Finland during the Cold War was actually a 1 on the scale I made up, combining being useful (like in trade), not being actively harmful, and being difficult to invade and hold. I faked it with calling it "Full Finlandisation" because I don't remember the word for a state fully at the mercy of a belligerent neighbour (a vassal state is one that pays tribute/is subservient, that doesn't match).
We obviously can't conclude that "the West betrayed Ukraine once again", because it isn't true. First, nobody owes Ukraine, or Estonia, or Sweden, or Europe in general, anything. The EU or NATO aren't obliged to take in Ukraine or Estonia or Sweden, though if they do they are indeed obliged to defend them. Thus the NATO promises are stronger to Estonia than to Ukraine or to Sweden. Which is a headache because Estonia isn't easy to defend, a small, relatively flat country next to some of Russia's largest military bases. Estonia is as much a NATO country as Kaliningrad is Russian. Would NATO go to nuclear war over Ukraine? No, but neither would Russia (primarily because they would lose).
The same goes for economy. Europe is expected to lose 1½–2 trillion euro in lost growth this year due to the Russian invasion. The few billions going to arm Ukraine is pocket money. But EU can be expected to fund Ukraine with hundreds of billions mostly after the war, and perhaps if unlikely Russia will chip in with some war reparation as well. They/we don't have to, and there would be voices that say we shouldn't. It does not seem that these voices are going to be heeded.
Europe does not profit from this war, nor do any European country including Russia. They have exchanged a low-cost frontline inside Ukraine with a high-cost. As long as Ukraine doesn't budge Russia will have to eventually, years from now. And Europe hasn't budged, not even Italy or Greece.
