I'm not a vegetarian and I don't understand vegetarians. Man is naturally omnivorous, as teeth disposition and shape, as well as the digestive system clearly shows.
It's a funny thing. Most of the time during the day we don't eat. We do all sorts of other things. Then again, we (tend to) eat every day. (I don't eat every day, but I don't know anyone else like me, so I can't say the world is weird. It must be something with me.) So, are we eaters or are we not? It's said we eat to live, but in reality we live just a couple of hours and then we fall back to eating again. Pointless vicious circle.
The base of most of my cooking tends to be onion, garlic, and mushrooms stir-fried in some (olive) oil. You can pretty much take that in any direction you want, depending on the vegetables and herbs you add.
Right. Already here shows the big difference between a cook and a non-cook. I don't have "the base of my cooking". I eat whatever is universally edible. I care little beyond this.
As to my totally unique recipe, I had these initial requirements: - Simple ingredients (available at any grocery store, no additives) - No weird utensils or cooking tricks, just a knife, stove, pot and/or a pan - Can be kept overnight and warmed up again
I like cheese soups and I studied the recipes to get ideas. There was a problem with all the recipes. It seems that cheese soups invariably require bouillon cubes. This is already an additive and goes beyond the requirement of simple ingredients. So I began forcibly experimenting by melting cheese in warm milk. Most cheeses turn into ugly clumps this way, but I found some smoked cheeses that don't. Some types of smoked cheese melt evenly. So I settled with those.
So, this is the "base" of the cheese soup part: Smoked cheese melted in warm milk. Nothing else. Literally.
Then there's the rice porridge part. It's just cooked rice. Nothing else. Literally. I mix freshly cooked rice in the milk-cheese. If the density doesn't come out right (too fluid usually) then I add crumbs of bread too. Black rye bread of course. This is the only bread I acknowledge.
And this is it. No salt even. The cheese contains enough salt of its own. With sufficiently thick density, the leftovers can be kept overnight in the fridge and warmed up on a pan for next meal. This of course gives rise to the last ingredient: some grease or oil on the pan.
I imagine I'm not telling you much, if anything, you don't already know. But if I am, I'll be glad to share some other possible directions.
You told me a bunch of stuff beyond my level. I don't understand the idea of seasonings and "whatever rocks your boat". I eat to be able to stand up, not to get rocked. The idea of having base ingredients and then taking this to some "direction" when cooking seems reasonable, but my base is evidently too basic and everything beyond it is too complicated for me.
Our approach to food is diametrically opposite. You watch your diet to get full and tasty meals. I watch my diet to avoid things that are too weird or directly harmful. If I could, I would avoid eating altogether. Eating is a nuisance.
It would be appropriate for me to include myself in the ranks of the agnostics because I live in a world that's characterized by uncertainty and wonder rather than certainty and doctrine.
Isn't it rather certain that uncertainties lurk behind every corner and hide themselves in every nook and cranny and then trouble you in your sleep? My temperament is to methodically address uncertainties, paradoxes, and problems, until they are figured out, solved, and answered. I don't like unanswered questions. In the end, I have found no question unanswerable. The result is life free of surprises and wonders. May seem boring to you, but I call it trouble-free.
A very practical religion, Islam, much more than Christianism. Wash your hands, don't eat this, don't eat that, all of that were what we can call proper public health measures at the time, to prevent epidemics. So religion and practical life are much more connected amongst them.
It's really interesting to speak with any cult Muslim person and compare both religions. In preference, somewhere where they can enjoy a whiskey, they will be glad to offer you one as the excellent hosts they are.
Appropriate description, I must say. People everywhere are usually just people, not some murderous maniacs.
I have also had the opportunity to enjoy the hospitality of Muslims. It seems to be culturally required, but it's also remarkably impeccable. Both Islam and Judaism are very practical religions in terms of hygiene and such. But Islamic civilisation is superior on the outside. Both Judaism and Islam originated among obscure desert peoples, but Jews remained an obscure desert people until Christians made them prominent. In contrast, Muslims made themselves a world power all by themselves.
As to religion of peace, I don't know of any grand civilisation that would be peaceful. Just like the "love" is a slogan in Christianity that can mean anything, so is it with "peace" in Islam. Jews and Christians taught this to Muslims. Not that Muslims are blameless now, it's just that all cultures share this feature and tend to mutually reject and annihilate each other based on this.
Still, as regular people, I have found it easy to get along with Muslims.
I'm not strictly vegetarian either, but I should be. More precisely I'm pescetarian. Non-eating is easy for me, but unfortunately I have family etc. It's not nice to inconvenience them by starving myself to death.
Btw, the recipe I invented myself is a kind of mix of cheese soup and rice porridge. Do you have some simple and convenient vegetarian recipes you have tried and can recommend?
I am vegetarian. Even though I don't care about cooking, I am forced to, because in this country it's near-impossible to get vegetarian food. I even invented a recipe of my own.
Seems so that if you care about what you eat, you have to cook your own food to some extent. I even used to grow my own food. I was born to a family of farmers.
What if you hold false beliefs? How would you revise them? For example, I find your implicit suggestion that "synapses in your brain" correspond to beliefs as open to immediate attack. How do you justify this contention? Any evidence? If it turns out dubious, would you revise it?
If you're ignorant of basic neuroscience, here's a semi-random place to start: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aphasia Semi-random because you could say Broca was the first neuroscientist, or at least the most famous early one, and that's what he studied.
My "implicit suggestion" was more of a pars pro toto. If there was an implicit suggestion, it's that it's all wholly and completely physical. Would I revise that suggestion if it turned out to be dubious? Well, why wouldn't I?
I know enough about neuroscience to know that nobody has ever detected a belief in the brain or observed revisions of beliefs in terms of synapses in the brain.
Also, I know about psychology. Aphasia is a defect of communication. Communication is distinct from reflection and self-reflection. Beliefs are of the reflective and self-reflective sort primarily, and of communicative sort only secondarily. How? You can hide your true motivation by your expression and behaviour, you can deceive people as to your true loyalties. That's how.
So, your example was not just semi-random. It was completely random, and unfortunately inapplicable.
You're clearly still missing the point about the evolution of ideas. Okay, so there's a teapot in space undetectable by telescope. And as you indicated, a teapot undetectable by telescope might still be detectable by e.g. sending over some kind of space vessel. This changes what exactly? Even adding the undetectable by telescope attribute is already part of the evolution.
Evolution of ideas is connected to (un)detectability how? Are true ideas detected? Detected as what? As synapses in the brain? Can you bring an example? (Aphasia was inapplicable. Let's have an applicable example.)
By logical inference from knowing you and knowing what china is. Note: The basis for the judgement would be knowledge, not ignorance. This is inverted in your case.
That's the only potentially valid objection to the teapot you've managed to muster thus far: we know a thing or two about teapots. The teapot argument presumes that knowledge about teapots to be correct, while that's actually the point it sets out to prove. However, you feign knowledge where there is none, which is the problem I've been pointing out all along.
I feign knowledge where there is none? You are open to the same charge. You feign knowledge that your "potentially empirically detectable" teapot is unreal, but there is a crucial distinction between undetected (i.e. not yet known, but knowable in principle) and unknowable (whatever this may be, Russell's analogy is not about this and neither is your formulation). You are not talking about unknowable. You are talking about *potentially detectable* while pretending it's the same thing as unreal!
Here's how the distinction is important. Potentially detectable may be, for example, a faint whiff of wind that your skin may not feel if it's insensitive enough but that may cause e.g. a feeble leaf to move. If you don't notice the leaf, the potentially detectable whiff of wind will remain undetected by you. If you notice the leaf, the potentially detectable whiff of wind becomes empirical reality for you. However, even if you don't detect it, it's an empirical reality that you failed to detect. It's not unreal either way. It's flawed logic to conflate undetected with unreal. This is even a scientifically important distinction. In math, infinitesimals are not zeroes.
Here are some more metaphysical distinctions (just to show you what I think about stuff, if you are really interested in dialogue. If not, you can safely ignore this. Or you can refute or ridicule these distinctions, whichever way you want it.). Unknowable does not mean unreal. Unreal means *does not exist*. Unknowable exists, but it escapes empirical detection and grasp of mind for whatever reasons.
Then there are also empirically undetectable knowables. Concepts (e.g. beliefs!) are of this sort - knowable and thus existent, but empirically undetected. Math (and any other science and laws of nature) are also knowable, but empirically undetectable (not even potentially empirically detectable). You can't detect abstract circularity or the number 0, 1, -1 or pi. Coherent mental activity (logical inference and deduction) is a form of detection, if you insist, but unempirical. You can't mechanically/electronically record and reproduce a trail of thought in a person. Evolution is not empirically detected in nature. Evolution is a conclusion from facts of nature that seem to imply evolution. There are empirically detected facts of nature for which the best explanation may be evolution, but you can't take evolution and put it on someone's table to "prove" it to him. You can show the facts and hope the facts lead him to the same conclusion. The facts are empirical, but evolution is an unempirical knowable.
I've seen Christians quite rationally tear down Islamic concepts without realizing much the same arguments would dismantle their own faith. Sure, there are some caveats, but it's all about not applying a double standard.
It's not a test of rationality. It's applicable only to adherents of traditional religion. Converts don't qualify and atheists don't qualify either. Hence we both don't qualify here.
The point is to subject your own beliefs to the same amount of skepticism and rational inquiry that you do others. Your contention that converts and atheists already do is special pleading.
More crucial distinctions. Born atheists have evidently not exercised skepticism to the extent that they'd have converted, right? So, if the test is to be impartial, it should invite conversion in both directions, right?
Then there's a class of people that may superficially fail the test, yet be perfectly rational, namely those whose beliefs have undergone and withstood all tests of time, inquiry, adequacy, utility. What kind of outsider would be able to evaluate this? Let's say you are evaluating me in this interaction. Do I seem like someone who has not questioned his own beliefs and reasoned his way towards a systematic world view? Someone at loss with answers? Someone easily refuted? In turn, I don't see you too keen to revise or improve your beliefs when they don't carry too far in argumentation.
The connection is that this is how it sounds to outsiders. You obviously don't think it's ridiculous, so one has to come up with something everyone thinks is ridiculous to demonstrate. Is it a joke? Maybe, but a joke with utility.
I have enough sense of humour to see how it is a joke. I also have enough reason to see how it is an inside joke rather than an outsider's view at Christian beliefs. It doesn't address the mainstream Christian beliefs, much less the concept of God in general. It's an inside joke for atheists. It offends only literalist fundies. It does not concern anybody else's religious beliefs, except maybe make sympathetic people sad how such a great guy as Russell could stoop so low as to offend those who deserve pity rather than ridicule. Well, I forgive him, if he meant it as a joke.
As I argued before - with references to Russell - Russell certainly knows what immaterial is, and thus he certainly knows his analogy is not an analogy about it. It's not a logical argument. Here comes a funny thing now. The element that makes the joke work is the fact that atheist physicalists share the concept of God with literalist fundies. Both are essentially ontological materialists. Both think "God is out there" (with all its implications). Scriptural literalists think this affirmatively, atheists negatively. Atheist physicalists and literalist fundies conceive their ontology the same way. They are the same class of people. So it's an inside joke, a ridicule of atheists' own mirror image.
Mainstream believers and theologians don't think "God is out there". In the mainstream, God is immaterial, incorporeal, both transcendent and immanent.
Your non-answers and lack of rigour are becoming very disappointing. But the fact is that I have to get along with you, so I will try to avoid picking on you directly. Luckily you gave some other guy to pick on.
Your favorite physicist, Lawrence Krauss, had something interesting to say about it:
Quote from: Lawrence Krauss
To those who wish to impose their definition of reality abstractly, independent of emerging empirical knowledge and the changing questions that go with it, and call that either philosophy or theology, I would say this: Please go on talking to each other, and let the rest of us get on with the goal of learning more about nature.
Okay. First, this quote from him does not address me, because I offered you a chance to define reality and existence on your own terms. I am not imposing my own definitions. The offer still holds, by the way. I exposed my definitions first, so you could see the way I reason. You don't have to go by my definitions. Spell out your alternatives and we can go by those. This is called generous.
Second, Krauss's non-answer yields the exact opposite result to his aims. He is supposed to be exposing religious dogmatism and irrationality, but with his lack of definitions (this quote is an excellent example of such, thanks Frenzie) and open rejection of the law of non-contradiction (in this particular quote, discouraging the "abstract" while promoting "changing questions" is self-contradictory) the result is that concepts that have come up thus far - empiricism, reality and existence - become unquestionable dogmas. Well, worse than dogmas. They are dogmatic, but without definitions they are also irrational mystified absolutes - religiously so.
Religious theology has not been this grievous. God has been absolutised, yes, but never undefined. The commandments may seem dogmatic, but their purpose is clear, graspable to anyone with common sense and they are also practical for everyday life.
In contrast, empiricism's purpose is utterly unclear. There's talk of progress, but no talk about where the progress should take us to. There's no ethical check on it. And my attempts to call for a definition of reality and existence from you - generously as per your convenience, not as per mine - are only met with irrational scorn.
So, for balance let's reformulate your marginally interesting outsider's test that you brought up in the other thread. Let's reformulate it so as to suit everyone, not just traditional religion. How many of us were born into the religion/ideology we currently confess to? I suppose only SF. And probably half of the atheists. Makes a funny bunch to look at from the outside
So, we need to reformulate the outsider's test so as to be applicable to everyone. Let's say that the main idea in it is that there's a standard for presented arguments. Impartial standard. The standard is this: When you criticise and reject a form of argument that the opponent presents in support of his own concepts, thou shalt not use the same form of argument to support your own concepts. Conversely, when you accept a form of argument to support your own concepts, thou shalt also accept the same form of argument in support of the opponent's concepts.
Example: I like definitions. I laid out my definitions as a metaphysical concept system to have a place both for everything existent and everything non-existent. The topic is religion, where the current charge is that God does not exist, has no proof-evidence-verification, and/or is unreal. As per my standard, for these objections to apply, existence, proof-evidence-verification and reality must be defined. Why? Because those are the things that the charge is about. Otherwise the objections don't apply. Am I really asking too much?
Moreover, when there's the charge that God does not exist, has no proof-evidence-verification and is unreal, then it would be nice of the chargers to not leave their own key concepts open to the same charge. The quote from Krauss is a good example here. He doesn't define or prove any of his concepts. He complains about reality being defined abstractly, without giving his own concrete definition. He also complains about reality being defined independently from emerging empirical knowledge, without spelling out the relationship or dependence that the two are supposed to have. He suggests that reality be tied to changing questions that go along with emerging empirical knowledge, but if so, then this make the definition of reality necessarily fluid and malleable - changing, the exact opposite of concrete. So, the brief quote from Krauss is a failure by its own standards. And the charger's standards are the first ones to try in the outsider's test, to be properly impartial.
The standard to be used in the test is exposed by the charge itself. Krauss is criticising abstractions, lack of emphasis on empirical knowledge and lack of flexibility ("changing questions"), while his own statement is vague (no concrete definitions) and does not stem from empirical knowledge of any sort (as in citation of specific sources or reference to some empirical objects). He is criticising undefined unreferenced general concepts in a statement completely consisting of undefined unreferenced general concepts. Some of these concepts he condemns ("abstract", "philosophy", "theology") while he promotes others ("[concrete] reality", "empirical knowledge", "changing questions", "nature"), but since all the concepts lack definitions, the charge is perfectly convertible, meaning that the concepts he promotes obtain the qualities that he condemns - abstractness, philosophy, theology. Thus the statement fails the test.
That's all trivially true, because of course the synapses in your brain are real. That doesn't mean the synapses correspond to real things outside of your brain. It's also the very reason people should have a strongly vested interest in eradicating false beliefs. Steven Weinberg wrote, "for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." That's true insofar as religion corresponds to false beliefs. But any false belief will do, and one needn't be religious to hold a false belief.
What if you hold false beliefs? How would you revise them? For example, I find your implicit suggestion that "synapses in your brain" correspond to beliefs as open to immediate attack. How do you justify this contention? Any evidence? If it turns out dubious, would you revise it?
1. Is the "potentially empirically detectable teapot" the same teapot that Russell referred to?
Yes. I phrased it that way at your insistence.
I most definitely didn't ask you to formulate it this way. What was wrong with some formulation more true to Russell's? Was he wrong after all? If so, why not admit it and revise your belief?
3. If not, then how does the outsider know that it's just a silly teapot?
How do you know it's silly if I say I've got five million china teapots at home?
By logical inference from knowing you and knowing what china is. Note: The basis for the judgement would be knowledge, not ignorance. This is inverted in your case.
If this test is meant to eliminate bias, then it fails miserably. It is specifically designed to attack traditional religion, not religion in general. It's not a test of rationality. It's applicable only to adherents of traditional religion. Converts don't qualify and atheists don't qualify either. Hence we both don't qualify here. It's irrational of you to refer to this test. It's inapplicable here. Its connection with Russell's analogy (the analogy that is either false or meant as a joke, most likely both) also remains unexplained.
Very disappointing. Follow your own advice and consider a complete overhaul of your methodology.
You would see that the concept of God I referred to is universal, if you even superficially read anything about theology.
Why would knowledge of God require theology? Aren't you just disputing with the voices in other people's heads?
Ironic as it may seem, ignorance of God requires some theology to bring you up-to-date with what you are ignorant of.
So much for 'universally accepted', eh? Then again, by 'universally accepted' you obviously mean 'accepted by people ersi agrees with'.
I am not singling out any author for you. Just get a grip of the topic in general. Unfortunately you don't have it right now. You fail to grasp that God is immaterial, even though this is universally accepted in theology the same way as there are basics to arithmetic and geometry that you find in absolutely any math textbook without any need for me to single out any particular one. This is what I mean by universally accepted.
This is a serious problem with atheists - they have absolutely no clue about what they are in denial of. And no willingness to verify either. With all your talk about evidence and verification, why don't you verify something as simple as this?
In addition to already linked reviews, I am also linking here a talkie video about Mint 16 Cinnamon. The desktop in the video is already customised a bit. The structure of the video is basically to go over the official release notes http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wx1ZK_XwUiA
And here's Cinnamon 2 on Manjaro. This video has the same structure, going over the official release notes of Mint. The guy doesn't directly say this in the video, but I know that he has installed Cinnamon 2 on Manjaro https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kmj25juB5-w
You would see that the concept of God I referred to is universal, if you even superficially read anything about theology.
Why would knowledge of God require theology? Aren't you just disputing with the voices in other people's heads?
Ironic as it may seem, ignorance of God requires some theology to bring you up-to-date with what you are ignorant of.
One could see theology as a "third element" that interposes between Man and a possible direct knowledge of God, a rationalization that doesn't have necessarily to exist. Such "third element" could be considered as something that separates instead of unifying.
That would be a very, very mystical approach, or, at least, deeply religious. Not certainly Ersi's and very surprising to be OakdaleFTL's.
Actually, there's nothing mystical about my suggestion. When you don't know God, then reading about theology is as common sense as picking up a math textbook when you don't know about math.
The main point of my posts in this thread was exactly to emphasise that to presuppose empricism in everything is presupposing too much. Surely you didn't miss this point.
Neither science nor physics nor atheism presupposes any such thing. They presuppose that empiricism is a useful way to learn more about the world, which has been more than sufficiently confirmed. The better question is, why do you presuppose the opposite?
I presuppose the opposite such as that empiricism is not a useful way to learn more about the world? I don't. I observe that empiricism is a way to learn about the world that imposes itself forcefully and this alone should raise suspicion about its usefulness, if you have capacity for critical thinking. Specific concerns are that the empirical way is either superficial or destructive. E.g. to examine an animal empirically, you either watch it from the outside or cut it up, kill it. Therefore proceed with caution when employing the empirical method. This caution is more important than empiricism (which doesn't mean that empiricism is absolutely useless - it only means it's limited). And note that it was not the empirical method by which I arrived at this conclusion of caution about empiricism.
Some check marks of good epistemology are the willingness to revise your beliefs and to say you don't know when you don't know. It should also consist of reason, rationality, and science. You attack these rather purposeful features as if they were a weakness. I think my view should be obvious by now: if your epistemology is missing one or more of those features, you're probably not saying anything meaningful at all.
As if I had been saying something different. Where did I attack reason, rationality and science? Where was I against revision of beliefs? I am against blowing the role of empiricism out of proportions so that it's raised over rationality.
Your self-contradiction on the other hand is marked. It could be easily remedied with proper rational prioritisation. The self-contradiction I refer to is emphasising empiricism as a great positive value in the first part of your post and rationality in the latter part, while ignoring that they are contradictory.
Let's say it is the ontological argument. Refute it.
I can make up all kinds of things. Doesn't mean they exist.
In philosophy and logic, when you "make up", then it comes to be. It means it will exist. And its seeds are already here and now.
For example consider some things often thought of as "unreal" but with unmistakably real consequences: Nightmare that gives you real scare, sweat on your skin and trembling in your muscles. Voices in your head that tell you to kill the prime minister. The prime minister will be in real danger and you *will* be put away... Psychologically, metaphysically, ethically, legally and socially these are not unreal things even though they may be completely "made up".
My argument, therefore, is: Be very careful what you make up, because it *will* become reality, if it already isn't.
You're still missing the point. It's about how the teapot can evolve from this potentially empirically detectable teapot into a sophisticated, reasoned, immaterial teapot. But to an outsider, it's still a silly teapot.
I suppose I am indeed missing the point. The reason is that I am trying to take you seriously. I am trying to think how you are making a reasoned argument. I have these questions about your argument:
1. Is the "potentially empirically detectable teapot" the same teapot that Russell referred to? 2. If yes, did the outsider detect it or not? 3. If not, then how does the outsider know that it's just a silly teapot? 4. If yes to #2, then we are back at #1, because Russell says the teapot is too small to be detected, in which case you are making a different argument than Russell. Spell out your own argument so that I may not miss the point! 5. Disregarding all about detection and granting that the "insiders" have a different idea of the teapot than the outsider - how do you determine that the outsider's view is correct? And when you have a way of determining this, doesn't this make *you* the true impartial otsider rather than the outsider your argument is referring to? Isn't the outsider of your argument enmeshed in his own ideas about other things with regard to which he is an insider? In other words, how do you define the outsider? An example/analogy would be helpful, thanks.
Are you saying that mankind is the greatest and there's nothing greater than mankind? How do you justify this belief?
For me, it's not a matter of belief. It's a matter of inevitable logical deduction. Once you arrive at the conclusion, you either face the consequences of your own thinking or you will deny your own mind to your own detriment. No belief necessary at any stage.
That sounds an awful lot like an ontological argument.
Let's say it is the ontological argument. Refute it.
[snipping an awesome quote from Russell] (But although some denominations of Hinduism hold a monotheistic viewpoint, I'm not sure if that suffices to say he's wrong as such.)
Even ancient pre-Christian Greeks (at least the philosophically-minded ones) had a solid concept of an abstract God above/beyond all others. Read Plato's Republic and other works for extensive discussion about God without a name. Had Plato been an entrenched polytheist, he surely would have given a name to the god he was referring to. Sure, there are gods with names there too, but this makes it all the more clearer that Plato was able to distinguish between particular gods plus the abstract one.
As to Hinduism, instead of polytheism, consider the concepts of monolatrism and kathenotheism.
To claim that your god concept is nothing at all like an immaterial teapot is special pleading.
"Immaterial teapot" is a contradiction in terms. Russell did not make such a mistake. Actual quote from Russell: "If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes."
Instead of immaterial, he suggests it's "too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes". He is clearly talking about detecting. So, no, he is not talking about immaterial. He is enough of a philosopher and logician to know that immaterial is irreconcilable with empirical detection. Consequently, I tend to suspect that he tacitly knew he was not refuting God as defined in theology. He was just making a little joke at the expense of literalist fundies, even though his atheist followers think he was making an actual serious philosophical argument. It's likely that he didn't. It's also possible that he did, but then he was crudely mistaken.
Anyway, to get back to the point that Mac was valiantly trying to discuss, there is arguably a truth to the universality of mankind's need to believe in something greater than himself (I think it goes back to the Mother/Child relationship), but that is not the same as there being a consensus on everyone believing in one God. Some think God is Allah, others think it is the Sun, others the Earth and so on. Even within nominally the same religion there are different views. If there were a single God then he/she/it would have some form of multiple personally disorder.
Look, we all clearly don't have the same mother. Pretty much all of us in this forum have a different mother, and we even have a different word for mother in our respective languages, so how can there be a universal Mother/Child relationship? But if you can infer a universal Mother/Child relationship beyond all our particular mothers, then what prevents you to see the same about "mankind's need to believe in something greater than himself"? Are you saying that mankind is the greatest and there's nothing greater than mankind? How do you justify this belief?
For me, it's not a matter of belief. It's a matter of inevitable logical deduction. Once you arrive at the conclusion, you either face the consequences of your own thinking or you will deny your own mind to your own detriment. No belief necessary at any stage.
The point he's making is that there's no sense in believing something exists if there is no evidence whatsoever for it and its existence can't be verified. What you're trying to do is obviously to construct yourself an abstract thing you can call 'god' which doesn't need evidence. Unfortunately it's indistinguishable from the voices in your head.
The point that Russell missed in all this was that the "abstract thing" was the universally accepted definition of God in theology all along. Just read some Augustine or Thomas Aquinus (Christians) or Avicenna or Ibn Tufail (Muslims) or absolutely anything about Vedanta or Buddhism. But you don't even need to read those.
It's enough to refer back to Russell's own concept of universals in his Problems of Philosophy to see how "abstract things" are actually more objective than empirical objective things. They make math work, they make logic work. By observing and following those "abstract things" we can tell if our thinking (or someone else's thinking) is right or wrong, true or false, makes sense or not. Those "abstract things" - universals - are the measure, the absolute standard. You would not be able to even argue against me without thinking that you have such a standard, the standard which is abstract by definition. There is no other verification than by means of those "abstract things".
Truth is one such thing. Can you show me the truth? No. It's abstract. Since this is so, does truth not exist because it can't be "verified"? Russell surely believed truth exists, even though his own reasoning showed it's an a priori abstract universal and cannot be empirically verified.
Let's say that the analogy was, as you say, about "believing something exists if there is no evidence whatsoever for it and its existence can't be verified". Unfortunately the analogy of a teapot in the sky does not apply when we are talking about immaterial things, because empirical verification does not apply to immaterial or metaphysical objects. What applies to immaterial and metaphysical objects is logical proof, mathematical proof. (All this this is argued by Russell himself in chapters 7-9 of Problems of Philosophy) In this kind of proof, empirical detection has absolutely no value as a measure of "existence". For example, anyone of us is able to detect their own dreams or voices in their own head, but you of course deny the value of those, even though they are detected! Hence detection by itself is insufficient for evidence or verification.
So, what evidence are you asking for? In metaphysics, the logical proof is absolutely dependent on definitions. Incidentally, this is so in investigative science too. The outcome of a science project depends a lot on how you formulate the problem. In logic and metaphysics, the outcome depends absolutely on how you define things. For example, if truth is abstract and you say that abstract things are non-existent, then your discussion with me is your own self-refutation, because you are talking about nothing by your own definition, while asserting that you are saying something. From my point of view, truth exists and is worth revealing and defending and this is why I am having this discussion.
If Russell's analogy is about an abstract or metaphysical object (which God is), it's a bad analogy because Russell's analogy refers to a physical empirical object, not to an abstract object as it should. On the other hand, if his analogy is meant as a shift-of-burden-of-proof device to show that it makes no sense to refute ad-hoc empirical objects, then the analogy is not just bad (because by virtue of being about empirical objects it cannot be about God), but FALSE. Namely, you CAN disprove ad-hoc empirical objects by going where the empirical object is and detect it there - or fail to detect it and thus disproving it. Empirical objects necessarily have location and can be detected. If the empirical object, such as a giant teapot in the sky, is not detected, then it doesn't exist. This is so by the definition of empirical objects.
So, to conclude, if Russell's analogy is about abstract metaphysical objects, it's a bad analogy. If it's about empirical objects, it's a false analogy. Not only do I see the point of his analogy, I also see where the analogy goes wrong. The analogy only works as a light joke, not as an insight about anything.
And I have the same conclusion about your remarks. If you want a further response from me, elaborate properly on your definitions, such as definitions of existence, evidence, verification etc.
Cinnamon works well as a desktop. Mint itself committed an insta-kernal panic when I tried to boot off the livedvd. I'm not saying Mint is bad, just that something about it evidently doesn't get along with my hardware. So I put Cinnamon on Ubuntu. I did find it a little odd that Ubuntu works just fine for me, but Mint doesn't.
I still haven't quite lived up to my words in the previous post. There's really no Cinnamon on the system that I use as a primary tool. I have only tried it occasionally on secondary installations. I liked it enough to plan to make it my main desktop.
On my primary laptop I have a preinstalled Ubuntu that jibes perfectly with the included hardware. Various other systems I have tried to install, all have their little problems, so my aim is to keep the perfect preinstalled Ubuntu, to skin it with Cinnamon and to convert it to Mint (not sure in which order) without screwing it up. Now with the new perfect Cinnamon I have no excuse to postpone my plan further. Must get on with it.
Now that's just plain ridiculous. Do you seriously believe that your concept of 'god' is the same as smiley's?
I have to give you this one. His concepts really are dismissible, probably even in the crude way Russell did.
But I'm not talking to him nor am I talking about him. I am talking to you and you are talking to me. Thus far you have responded to absolutely nothing I have had to say.
You would see that the concept of God I referred to is universal, if you even superficially read anything about theology. But I already got your point: You are just talking for the sake of talking, only using my posts as another opportunity to hear the sound of your own voice. You didn't even clarify how I was missing Russell's point. Hence I was not missing any point. End of story.
Cinnamon is my favourite desktop. I have seen it on the previous Mint release and it's absolutely fabulous already there. Under the hood I tend to prefer anything else than something based on Ubuntu, but still Mint's installer is the comfiest I have seen, so it's obvious why it's so popular.
Manjaro is learning fast from Mint's style. Cinnamon has been ported to Manjaro and it looks like the Manjaro team is doing their best to work to make the installer the same, Mint-like. Unfortunately Cinnamon didn't look and feel as polished on Manjaro as on Mint.
So, your preferred desktop is Xfce. I tried and didn't find Xubuntu so likeable (stylewise - there's no other reason to try Xubuntu than the desktop, is there?). In the order of my own preference, Manjaro, Mint, and Lite all have easily superior Xfce desktops when compared to Xubuntu.
When I opened up Xubuntu the first time, the desktop looked terribly bleak and screamed for customisation. So, naturally I opened up the settings and got on with it, but the choice of themes was, well, not there. Lite also looks kind of bleak at first, but it's packed with many themes, so it's quick to customise the look, while other defaults were mostly sane and workable for me.
Normally Mint would easily be the winner in style out of the box, but when I installed Manjaro 0.8.7.1, I found the respective Xfce desktops on a par. I cannot recommend one over the other. They are both perfect. And people say that Manjaro 0.8.8 looks even better. Admittedly it's the Manjaro team copying the style from Mint, but when they are both perfect, I see no reason to complain. Let them compete in making the world a better place.
Then maybe you are not so aesthetically inclined. Neither am I, really. Xfce is functional and this matters far more in the end. I'm just linking here a good overview of some Xfce distros, just so that I know myself how to find it later, good if someone else is interested too http://mylinuxexplore.blogspot.com/2013/01/best-linux-distro-of-2012-comparasion.html
You were referring to Russell's teapot, forgot that already?
Also, which "concept of god" is it this time around? Last time I checked there was no such thing as a universally accepted one.
Immaterial. Forgot that already?
And yes, this concept is universally accepted in all major religions (including Asian religions and ancient ones - Zeus was also immaterial) but you can limit yourself to Christianity so you remember the topic better.
Russell's teapot fails to address the universally accepted concept. I could elaborate on several aspects how his analogy fails, but it's not worth it as long as you are too brief yourself and possibly not even really interested in the topic.
All claims that God is unreal are as vain as the opposite claims, as long as reality or existence remain undefined.
We don't need a perfectly delineated definition of reality in order to work with it—especially not when talking about facts directly verifiable or directly deducible through empiricism.
The main point of my posts in this thread was exactly to emphasise that to presuppose empiricism in everything is presupposing too much. Surely you didn't miss this point.
However, I do like Philip K. Dick's quip: "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away." That is, reality is that which imposes the same kind of experiences on all of us; it exists independent of human thought or observation. Doubtless you'd come up with something clever to say about solipsism or some such, but you'd be quite correct to surmise I'm not interested.
Good quote, but I derive something totally different from it. There are many things that don't go away (and are thus real according to Philip Dick's definition) but about which people differ greatly. For example meaning of life. Is there one? What is it? Some people are greatly bothered by the question, others feel nothing. Then there are some who have the answer, whether you acknowledge it or not. Looking at the whole situation from afar unconcerned, observing those who wrestle with the question and those who don't, and the different answers and non-answers that people arrive at, you may be greatly amused at the different realities that people live in.
So, unless you are comfy with the meta-position (which I take you aren't: "Doubtless you'd come up with something clever..., but you'd be quite correct to surmise I'm not interested"), the definition of reality is rather relevant in our communication due to the evident fact that people have different realities.
I recommend methodical thinking to everyone plagued by doubts and caught at inconsistencies too often.
This is the problem with religion: putting metaphysics before epistomology. If you find reality is inconsistent, just admit you don't know instead of shoehorning the facts to align with your philosophy. When the facts contradict your beliefs, it's not the facts that should be adjusted.
In this post I presented a rather clear epistemological fact. I can explain the apparent inconsistencies in a consistent way, but it takes metaphysics to explain it. I presented my metaphysics to show what it's good for and in what way I use it, but I am kind enough to not force my metaphysics on you. Instead I'm giving you the chance to conjure up your own metaphysics that you think would work for you.
Looks like you are declining the offer. Thanks anyway.
Mathematical symbols and objects guide the thought process, they have explanatory power, they enable predictions. See the connection? Sure you do, but you deny it.
Sure - all human inventions, just like all gods. Oh, did you mean something else?
Russell's argument has nothing to do with whatever you're imagining right now or at any other time. Missing the point by a mile. At least. And deliberately.
If his argument had nothing to do with the actual concept of God, then it was a strawman. If it had nothing to do with anything, then it was worse than that.
Still missing the point, still quite deliberate.
You actually know the work I am referring to? Name its title along with its point [edit]and how I missed the point[/edit]. (Hint: You don't have to answer.)
So your god is nothing but an abstract concept which has about the same power to throw your ass into hell as a Riemann integral
Abstract concepts have amazing powers. Take right and wrong, true and false for example. Hell is when you are ignorant of the power of these concepts.
When was the last time an abelian group answered your prayers?
Mathematical symbols and objects guide the thought process, they have explanatory power, they enable predictions. See the connection? Sure you do, but you deny it.
Quote from: Macallan
Russell's argument has nothing to do with whatever you're imagining right now or at any other time. Missing the point by a mile. At least. And deliberately.
If his argument had nothing to do with the actual concept of God, then it was a strawman. If it had nothing to do with anything, then it was worse than that.
